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The purpose of this study is to provide the United States Navy with guidance for
the successful handling of public relations in peacetime naval disasters. It is an
examination of the many factors relevant to public relations activity in a disaster
situation.
To provide the broadest base possible the author has examined the results
of scholarly research on disaster, the salient thoughts of some public relations experts
and the public relations activities and plans of certain civilian and government organi-
zations. To formulate meaningful guidance the personal experiences of newsmen, public
relations experts and military public information officers has been sought utilizing the
interview technique and an open-end questionnaire.
Even in a study of this scope it is not possible to treat each aspect in detail.
It is inevitable that certain points have been inadvertently ommitted or have been given
only limited attention.
The author is deeply indebted to the many people who gave freely of their time
and resources to help him ascertain the facts. The various personnel of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, Department of
Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Army, and Air Force, were particularly helpful in
supplying official directives and pertinent inter-agency data.
The Public Relations Society of America and Mr. Robert L. Barbour, Editor of
the PR Reporter, provided much material concerning disaster public relations. Civilian





discussion of human behavior in disaster; notably Human Sciences Research, Inc. of
McClean, Va. , and the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University.
A special thanks to Mrs, Wilmar B. Day, file supervisor in the Office of
Information, Navy Department, who not only made her files available but permitted
the author to study at his leisure, hundreds of historical documents.
LCDR David M. Cooney, USN made the only carbon copy of his new book,
"A Chronology of the U. S. Navy — 1775-1965" available to the author prior to its
publication. The Chronology of Naval Disaster appended to this study (Appendix C) was,
for the most part, excerpted from Commander Cooney's detailed presentation.
Mr. John R. Blewer, Director of Public Relations for the Texas Gas Transmission
Corporation supplied copies of the manual "Meet The Press" and his permission to in-
clude it as an appendix to this study.
In addition to the many active duty and retired Navy Information Officers who
contributed their experience and support to this study the author is particularly grateful
to one of their number. The major point of contact with the Office of Information in the
Navy Department was Commander Robert S. Jones, USN, Director of the Plans Division
in that Office. He answered a multitude of detailed queries and demonstrated that no
piece of information was impossible to obtain.
In addition to hours spent in interview, Mr. Roy Popkin, Assistant to the
Director of Disasters Services, the American National Red Cross provided valuable
materials which greatly contributed to this study.
I must pay special thanks to Mr. Albert W. Lounsbury an insurance consultant and
friend who specializes in analyzing predictable hazards which might result in physical
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disaster or financial impairment to U. S. and foreign companies. He spent dozens of
evening hours objectively examining the author's work. If the passages which follow
have understandable continuity it is due in great part to his help and interest.
Finally, if this study makes some contribution to the practice of public relations
in naval disaster it is due in large measure to the supernatural understanding, confidence
and inspiration offered by my wife, Peggy. Aside from the daily tasks associated with
managing five children and at times an unreasonable and frustrated husband, she managed
to proof-read, type and retype tangled roughs, and otherwise assist me in surviving
the ordeal of research and composition.
The cooperation of all these organizations and individuals is gratefully acknowledged.
The contents of this study, however, rests entirely with the author. It should be specifi-
cally noted that the conclusions and recommendations do not necessarily constitute the
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DISASTER. .WHAT IT IS AND HOW HUMAN
BEHAVIOR IS AFFECTED BY IT
This is a study of disaster for the United States Navy. It relates
previous disaster research to the special problems of public relations in naval
disasters.
To establish the main points relative to disaster and the Navy, a
substantive background is needed. A brief history of disaster research and a
discussion of the most prevalent phenomena found by disaster studies will be
presented.
This study also examines the actions taken in past disasters to enable
the Navy to react with a greater degree of confidence and effectiveness in future
naval disasters.
Disaster Defined
It must be understood before anything else that disasters are abnormal
,
not normal occurrences. They are, therefore, inherently newsworthy.
The concept of disaster varies with the kind and degree of ego in-
volvement of the persons or groups concerned. The word "disaster" signifies one
thing to the family or community involved, another to the disaster research scientist,
and still something different to the governmental agency or voluntary relief organi-
zation charged with relief and rehabilitation measures. Webster says, "Disaster

implies an unforseen mischance bringing with it destruction of Life and property. . .
sudden and extraordinary misfortune; a calamity." One sophisticated definition
states that disaster is "A disruption in the normal flow of energy that is uncon-
trolled." 1
In reference to communities, one writer has said:
Disaster means the impinging upon a structured community
of an external force capable of destroying human life or
its resources for survival, on a scale wide enough to
excite public alarm, to disrupt normal patterns of be-
havior, and to impair or overload any of the central
services necessary to the conduct of normal affairs or to
the prevention or alleviation of suffering and loss.
Usually, the term disaster refers to an episode with
tragic consequences to a substantial portion of the
population.
The American Red Cross defines disaster as follows:
Disaster means a great national catastrophe such as a
flood, tornado, or hurricane, and also a sudden extraor-
dinary catastrophe such as fire, explosion, transportation
wreck, or similar public calamity in which numbers of
persons are plunged into helplessness and suffering.
In examining these few definitions, it would appear that disasters,
regardless of how or by whom defined, have certain common attributes. They
iL.V. Berkner, "The Common Aspects of Disaster, " an unpublished
address given at The American Association For The Advancement of Science
Symposium on Disaster Recovery, St. Louis, Mo., December 27, 1952.
John Walker Powell, "An Introduction To The Natural History of
Disaster," unpublished report of the Psychiatric Institute, University of Maryland,
1954.
3
Interview with Roy S. Popkin, Assistant to the National Director,
Disaster Services of the American Red Cross, Washington, D. C. , May 27, 1965.

3include injury, suffering, and/or death for several people and damage or destruction
to possessions and property. Peacetime disasters considered according to their
origins are of two main types; naturally occurring and man-made.
There is no definition for military or naval disaster contained in the
official military dictionary. However, any definition of peacetime naval disaster
would only differ from those listed above in the application of terms to naval
personnel, equipment, or installations. In terms of this study it must also be
remembered that naval disasters differ in the scope of public interest and concern.
A naval disaster in any locale provokes the interest of the entire country since
Navy personnel come from all corners of the United States. A Navy ship involved
in collision, for instance, may very well have representatives from all fifty states
in her crew.
Other Means of Describing Disaster
In addition to the two general classes of disaster, natural and man-made,
there are other descriptive differences which are helpful to consider.
Disasters differ in:
- The degree of their predictability.
- The degree of their probability.
- The degree of their control ability.
- The nature of the precipitating agent.
- Their origin.
- Their speed of onset.
Hoyt Lemons, "Physical Characteristics of Disasters: Historical and
Statistical Review, u The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social
Science
,
Vol. 309, January, 1957, p. 1.
2
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for
Joint Usage
,




- Their destructive effects on people and physical objects.
Of special interest to the Public Information Officer (hereafter re-
ferred to as P.I.O.) is a discussion of how human behavior differs in relation to
these particular features of disaster. Research has discovered that human be-
havior not only differs in relation to each of the features of disaster we have dis-
cussed above, but also differs within a particular disaster by:
- Spatial zones.
- Time periods.
- Type of involvement.
- Prior preparation and conditioning.
In a brief descriptive treatment such as this, it is not possible to
discuss each of these differences and all the effects which disaster may have on
human behavior. The many variables are presented to illustrate that human be-
havior in a disaster situation is a complex phenomenon.
Categorizing Disaster
There does not seem to be a commonly accepted system of categorizing
disasters beyond the two main divisions -- man-made or naturally caused. For






- All other storms (hail storms, snowstorms, etc.).
Charles E. Fritz, "Disaster," Contemporary Social Problems , ed.
Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
Inc.






Wrecks (train, ship, airplane, etc.)'
Other disasters (earthquakes, landslides, etc.).
History of Disaster Research
In 1950 a concerted effort to study human behavior in disasters began
in a systematic way. Since that time there have been numerous opportunities to
test the validity of the many popular conceptions concerning disaster behavior.
These studies have also tested the more scientific hypotheses relevant to human
behavior under conditions of stress and crisis. The Disaster Research Group
(formerly the Committee on Disaster Studies) of the National Research Council,
National Academy of Sciences, has for instance, prepared a series of nineteen
disaster studies which report the effects of natural and man-made disasters on
human behavior. There is currently a group of scholars and researchers engaged
in a similar fulltime study at the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University.
Other private organizations such as Human Sciences Research, Inc, of McLean,
Virginia, are performing similar research primarily under government contracts.
While most research on Human behavior in disaster has been accomplished
in the last fifteen years, there were some efforts in this area prior to that time.
Between World Wars I and II the first studies were carried out which attempted to
test or apply some of the systematic concepts of the social and behavioral sciences.
In 1920 S. H. Prince in Catastrophe and Social Change presented a study
of certain social phenomena following the explosion of a munitions vessel in Halifax
Popkin, op. cit.

6Harbor. This study, considered a pioneering effort in disaster research, examined
effects caused by the explosion of 450,000 tons of TNT occasioned by the ramming
of the munitions ship in the early morning of December 6, 1917. In severe winter
weather, the explosion caused a seismic shock which created a six foot tidal wave.
The shattering blast, the resultant fires and the wave killed over 2, 000 people.
Twenty years later, in 1940 Hadley Cantril made a unique study of the
reactions to the widely acclaimed radio broadcast which simulated an "Invasion
From Mars. " In this study the researcher performed a significant psychological
analysis of human behavior under the simulated threat of a terrifying disaster. He
was particularly concerned with the reasons for panic.
In analyzing interview data from 135 persons, most of whom were upset
by the broadcast, Cantril concluded that lack of critical ability was the key factor
in the panic. He further ascertained that critical ability was related to education
attainment.
It was only after World War II that actual programs of disaster research
began to take shape. The motivation for beginning these disaster studies was the
demonstrated effects of nuclear weapons and the realization that they could be used
again. Government agencies with the responsibility of planning for the hazards of
a nuclear age began to organize and support research that would advance the knowledge
George J. Palmer, Jr. , Individuals And Groups in Disaster, Schematic
Analyses of Disaster Literature
,
Institute of Behavioral Research, Texas Christian
University Topical Series Report N. 4b, June, 1963, p. B-90 .
2
Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, and Herta Herzog, The Invasion From
Mars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940).
3
Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs,
N. J.: Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 80.

and understanding of human beings in situations of acute stress and wholesale
destruction. Several studies were undertaken to examine the disastrous bombings
which had occurred in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. At about the same time,
a number of similar studies were begun to examine human behavior in disasters
from natural causes.
In 1952 at the request of the Armed Services, the National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council appointed a Committee on Disaster Studies
(reorganized in 1957 as the Disaster Research Group). With the backing of
several federal agencies and private foundations this committee set out to encourage
research on human problems during disaster and to advance communication and
planning among students of disaster. It also provided consultative services to such
agencies as the Federal Civil Defense Administration. From its inception this
Group has supported a wide-range of studies in the disaster area. Since it is not
possible to study human reaction to disaster in a controlled laboratory situation,
most of the studies undertaken have utilized the frequent opportunities given by
natural disasters of all sorts. Most are field studies carried out in stricken
communities as soon as possible after the impact of tornadoes, floods, explosions,
and similar catastrophic events.
The 1961 inventory by the Disaster Research Group of field studies lists
the following numbers of disasters treated:
- Twenty tornadoes.
- Thirteen fires and explosions.
- Twelve floods.
- Twelve hurricanes and typhoons.
- Eight earthquakes.
- Eight incidents involving poisonous or asphyxiating chemicals.

- Six false alerts.
- Five epidemics or threatened outbreaks.
- Four airplane crashes.
- Three blizzards.
- Two mine disasters.
- Six miscellaneous emergencies.
- Eleven civil defense exercises.
The total number of recorded interviews available from these studies is 14,461.
In addition, research on World War II bombings involved 7, 163 interviews.
In recent years there has been more activity initiated in this area.
Organizations such as the National Opinion Research Center, The Disaster Research
Center at Ohio State University, and commercial companies such as the Human
Sciences Research Inc. have led the field.
Why It Is Important To Study Disaster
The impetus for research studies of human behavior in disaster
developed from two interrelated practical needs:
A. To secure more adequate protection for the nation from the
destructive and disruptive consequences of potential atomic,
biological, and chemical attack.
B. To produce the maximal amount of disruption to the enemy in
the event of war.
While the financial backing is prompted by our society's necessary
preoccupation with nuclear warfare, disaster studies provide useful guidance in
^Dwight W. Chapman, "A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Disaster
Research," Man And Society in Disaster , ed. George W. Baker and Dwight W.








preventing or alleviating the stress and suffering of disaster. This practical
goal is itself worth pursuing.
Products of Disaster Research
The first research task was to break disaster down into meaningful
sections. It was determined that disaster can be usefully systematized by reference
to typical periods of time within the course of the disaster. The seven time phases
of disaster generally accepted and followed by most researchers today, are:
A. Warning - during which there arises
,
mistakenly or not, some
apprehension based on conditions out of which danger may arise.
B. Threat - during which people are exposed to communications
from others or to signs from the approaching disaster force it-
self indicating specific, imminent danger.
C. Impact - during which the disaster strikes with concomitant death,
injury and destruction.
D. Inventory - during which those exposed to the disaster begin to
form a preliminary picture of what has happened and of their own
condition.
E. Rescue - in which activity turns to immediate help for survivors,
first aid for the wounded, freeing trapped victims, fighting fires, etc.
F. Remedy - during which more deliberate and formal activities
are undertaken toward relieving the stricken and their community,
both by survivors and by the outside relief agencies that have
now moved into the scene.
G. Recovery ,- during which, for an extended period, the community
and the individuals in it either recover their former stability or
achieve a stable adaptation to the changed conditions which the





These divisions are helpful to the P.I.O. who must have some general
understanding of disasters. Phases C. through G. would be of particular interest
to the military information officer who is mostly concerned with man-made disaster.
Human Behavior In Disaster
On Friday, October 16th, 1953, the aircraft carrier USS LEYTE tied
to a dock in the Boston Naval Shipyard had an explosion in a catapult machinery
space. The blast killed 37 and injured 28. Included in the casualty lists were Navy
and Marine Corps personnel and civilian workmen.
On the morning of May 26, 1954, the aircraft carrier USS BENNINGTON
was enroute from Norfolk, Virginia to the Narraganset Bay operating area. About
6:15 A.M. the ship was shaken by a series of violent explosions. Ranking among
the worst disasters in Navy history, the explosions and ensuing fires killed 103
crewmen and left more than 100 injured.
On April 10, 1963 the nuclear powered submarine USS THRESHER was
conducting the last of a series of tests 225 miles east of Cape Cod. She submerged
at 8:00 A. M. The submarine with her crew of 108 and 21 civilian technicians was
never seen again. °
How do human beings react when they are involved in or vitally con-
cerned with such disasters?
1Boston Daily Globe
,




May 26, 1954, p. 1.
3 The Boston Globe, April 11, 1963, p. 1.
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According to one overemphasized concept, they panic. They trample
each other in a wildeyed drive to escape. They have no sense of concern for their
fellow human beings. This image has been reinforced by articles, books, movies
and television. However, as Fritz and Williams point out in their study on the
Human Being in Disasters:
Those experienced in actual disasters are able to reject
this picture as a product of ignorance, inaccurate observation,
and fertile imagination. In more subtle form, however, stereotypes
of this kind influence the thinking of disaster officials and ex-
perts and affect their plans and operations. This imagery, there-
fore, affects both the general public and persons who are re-
sponsible for protecting and helping the public in case of disaster. 1
The news media may be influenced by the same falacious image of human
actions during a disaster. The P.I.O. must remember this point in dealing with the
news media and insure to the best of his ability that an accurate image is projected.
As a result of the scores of domestic and foreign peacetime disaster
studies, there is now emerging a much clearer, more fundamental understanding
of both the typical human responses to disaster and the recurrent human problems
of disaster planning and management. This research is of great importance and of
more than passing interest to the P.I.O. who will stand between those caught in the
disaster and the general public.
Preparation and Disruption
It has been determined that the degree of disruption caused by a disaster
will be largely determined by the degree to which people have developed realistic
'Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams, "The Human Being in
Disasters: A Research Perspective, rr The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 309 (January, 1957), p. 42.
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expectations about and preparations for disaster.
In every society some kinds of disaster are anticipated.
As one student of disaster has pointed out:
There is probably no society in which there is not some
knowable possibility of disaster. These possibilities in-
clude:
- Accident - eg.
,
where there are chemicals, there
can be explosion.
- A persistent but presently inactive danger - eg.
, a
volcano.
- Recurring danger - eg. , river floods; and
- A unique danger - eg. , nuclear attack.
It has also been found that it is extremely difficult to establish an
adequate state of preparation under ordinary conditions. This is especially true
when there has been no recent experience with disaster and the threat therefore
seems highly indefinite or uncertain.
United States citizens, for instance, have been generally apathetic
toward the building of air raid shelters. This is probably true because the future
conditions of nuclear attack are painful to contemplate. There are no present re-
wards for the personal costs and sacrifices involved in making preparation or
realistic ways of testing whether the preparedness measures are effective. There
seems to be much time before one must make a decision and there is no apparent




Harry B. Williams, "Communication in Community Disaster"









way to cope with the problem by use of present resources.
The important point with respect to public relations in naval disaster
is that people and society, while aware that disaster is a possibility, are seldom
if ever ready for its impact.
Social Disorganization
People evidence a number of predictable reactions in a disaster situ-
ation which should be understood by the P.I.O. who will assist the media in re-
porting what is happening. Unfortunately there are a great many disruptive activi-
ties during most disasters which are misunderstood. While the behavior is typical
it is misinterpreted in most instances. For instance, the notion that people
"typically" panic, become hysterical or "go to pieces" in the presence of danger
is not at all supported by disaster research findings. Western culture often equates
flight with cowardice and the absence of flight with bravery, while obscuring the
fact that flight is often the only rational choice that individuals can make if they
wish to live. There is an old Chinese saying which expresses an opposite value
judgement about flight: "Of the thirty-six ways to escape danger, running away is
best."
1
Another sterotype common among the publics outside a disaster is the
belief that disasters render people a dazed and helpless mass, completely dependent
on outside aid for guidance and organization. Research findings show that the con-
trary is ture — that many of the immediate and pressing tasks of rescue and relief
are accomplished by the survivors themselves. It was further found that if a
1
C. C. Culmsee, "Tight Little Island of China, " New York Times
Magazine
,
August 19, 1956, p. 66.
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disaster-struck community is isolated for some time, it will develop forms of
emergency organization to cope with the given problems.
Unfortunately, the lack of a familiar, normal pattern of uniform activity
often leads the outsider to the erroneous conclusion that the disaster population has
"panicked". What is actually being observed is not panic, but social disorganization,
i.e.
,
uncoordinated activity on a general, community-wide or internal societal
level. It is most important for the P.I.O. to recognize that this social disorganization
need not indicate personal or small group disorganization. On the contrary, many
individuals and small groups are acting with specialized or limited purpose and
considerable control to solve the problems they immediately face. Since their
attention is apt to be focused on the immediate tasks at hand they appear oblivious
to the more general needs that have arisen as a result of the disaster.
Repeated research has determined that two common human responses
initially contribute to this form of social disorganization:
1. The initial tendency to particularize and personalize the
disaster; to think of it as happening only to oneself and
as being confined to one's immediate environment.
2. The anxiety and concern for the welfare of family members,
other kin, and intimates.
The second and more persistent, source of disorganization listed above
is of particular interest to this study. The survivors (military dependents for
instance) begin a desperate search for missing persons or for information about








concerning their intimates greatly contributes to the confusion usually observed in
a disaster situation.
Role Conflict
One inevitable human reaction to disaster is that of "role conflict".
It is largely caused by the separation anxiety noted above. Lewis M. Killian, a
noted disaster researcher has this to say about "role conflict":
When catastrophe strikes a community, many individuals
find that the latent conflict between ordinarily non-con-
flicting group loyalties suddenly becomes apparent and that they
are faced with the dilemma of making an immediate choice
between various roles. In all the communities (studied) there
were individuals, such as policemen, firemen, and public
utilities workers, whose loved ones were threatened by the
same disaster that demanded their services as "trouble
shooters. " Even persons who had such definite roles to play
in time of catastrophe were confronted with the alternatives
of seeing after only their own primary groups or of assisting
in the rescue and relief of any of the large number of injured
persons, regardless of identity. Indeed, only the unattached
person in the community was likely to be free of such a conflict.
Research has demonstrated that most people quickly resolve the conflict
in favor of loyalty first to their families or other intimates, and only then turn their
attention to larger and more impersonal social group loyalties. For people who
have clearly defined responsibilities in the disaster, however, the conflict often
persists and causes profound psychological disturbances. In short, a great many
people involved in or working around a disaster are not "themselves", for a number
Lewis M. Killian, "The Significance of Multiple-Group Membership in
Disaster, " American Journal of Sociology
,





of very good reasons. The P.I.O. who will interview, work alongside, or otherwise
depend on such distraught individuals should keep the concept of "role conflict"
firmly in mind.
Convergence Behavior
A major problem of coordination and control in disasters emenates not
from the victims, but from the informal, spontaneous "convergence action" of
persons living outside the disaster area. Here again, contrary to popular conception
of behavior in disasters, movement toward the disaster area is usually more
significant than flight or evacuation from it. In a very short period of time there
are many more pteople in the disaster area than there were before the disaster
occurred. Within minutes people begin to converge on the immediate area and on
first aid stations, hospitals, relief centers, and communication centers near the
area. In addition to this physical movement of persons, incoming messages of
anxious inquiry and offers of help from all parts of the country, and even from
foreign countries, begin to overload existing telephone, telegraph, and other com-
munication and information facilities.
Of particular interest is a closely related phenomenon called, "informa-
tional convergence. " Following the Waco, Texas, tornado on May 11th, 1953, a
study was made by the Department of Sociology at the University of Texas. Here
is a portion of what they found:





. . . the long distance dial system in Waco was set up to handle
100 telephone calls simultaneously, but two to three hours
after the tornado the incoming calls were so numerous that
outgoing calls had to be delayed as much as six hours. So
great was the jam, the manager of the Waco office phoned the
National Broadcasting Company in New York to broadcast
an appeal to the nation asking that calls into Waco be re-
stricted to real emergency messages. In the twenty-four
hour period immediately following the disaster, the telephone
company handled 22,420 long distance calls (both incoming
and outgoing). The normal load for a similar period was
approximately 45% less than this. Likewise, so many
messages flowed through the local telegraph office that
five additional substations had to be opened. A total of nearly
37, 000 were handled on the day following the tornado, compared
with a normal day average of about 1,000 messages. A similar
heavy flow of messages is noted for the post office, the com-
mercial radio stations, the "Ham" radio operators, and the
Military Affiliate Radio System.
The problem of controlling convergence is often too narrowly conceived
as one of blocking or restraining "sightseers", "looters", and other "unauthorized
personnel". Many have the mistaken notion that people who converge on a disaster
area from the outside have exploitation motives. However, the incidence of looting
and other forms of exploitation actually found in disasters is slight when compared
with actions motivated by anxiety over missing relatives and friends. Sympathy for
the stricken population, a real desire to help, and interest in an unusual or unfamiliar
event are also causes of convergence. To meet these needs in a sensible manner, the
disaster management, and in particular the P.I.O. must provide adequate information
positive direction, and guidance, rather than indiscriminate restraint.
'Harry E. Moore et al . , "Waco-San Angelo Disaster Study: Report Of




Disasters As Unifying Force
Disaster studies have shown that man is a highly adaptive social animal
when confronted with direct threats to his continued existence. * Repeated research
has shown that disasters quickly unify societies. This was noted when William James
reported on the San Francisco earthquake in 1906. He testified to a sense of reas-
surance about human nature stemming from the rapidity with which people improvised
order out of chaos. He was also pleased by the "universal equanimity" of the
survivors. Many research projects from that time until this (notably, several
recent studies by the Ohio State University Disaster Research Center) have confirmed
these earlier observations.
Contacting such a strongly unified society from the "outside", particularly
when in the company of news media representatives can represent an additional threat
to a wounded society. The P.I.O. may be considered an intruder, come to pry or
drive a wedge into a solidly unified group. He must therefore act with decorum,
tact, and understanding — and above all, restrain those with him from antagonizing
the victims. If the P.I. O. can establish himself as an ally of the striken society
rather than a potential enemy, he will most probably serve that community, his
organization, and the media in a positive and constructive manner.
Situational Therapeutic Features And Adjustments
Out of each thing bad, there seems to come some good. World War n









Some good also seems to emenate from a disaster particularly in the area of
community action and improved social interaction. One sociologist calls them
situational therapeutic features and adjustments. While much too complex to
treat in depth here, they are listed in brief to help form a better understanding of
the social aspects of disaster.
Situational Therapeutic Features:
An essential feature of disaster is that the threats and dangers to the
society come from outside the system and their causes can be clearly perceived and
Specified. Disasters give people an external, objectively specifiable source of
worry and concern toward which action can be directed.
The remedial needs in disaster — the needs for rescue, clearance of
debris, rebuilding, etc. — are immediate and imperative needs which are also
clearly specifiable in the external environment, and toward which direct physical
action can be directed to produce readily discernible results. In disasters, needs
and need fulfillment are so closely related, so evidently imperative for human survival,
and so widespread in import that consensus is readily achieved.
Disaster provides an unstructured social situation that enables persons
and groups to perceive the possibility of introducing desired innovations into the
social system. Changes and adjustments made during the emergency period give
proof that the restructuring or changing of the social system is possible. People
see the opportunity of realizing certain wishes which remained latent and unrealizable
under the old system. The possibility that these changes in the culture may be
affected or continued lends a positive aspect to disasters not normally realizable
in other types of stress situations.
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Culturally derived discriminations and social distinctions tend to be
eliminated in disaster because all groups and statuses in the society are indiscrimin-
ately affected; danger, loss, and sufffering become public rather than private
phenomena. This is the one feature which distinguishes disaster from other forms
of crises. Since the disaster comes from outside the social system and indis-
criminately affects persons of all groups, there is a temporary breakdown in
social class, ethnic group, and other hierarchical status distinctions, and a general
democratization of the social structure.
Therapeutic Adjustments to Disaster:
Pre-existing values and norms and future goals are sloughed off and
viewed as irrelevant, ie. values and norms are emergent rather than preordained.
Disasters provide a temporary liberation from the worries, inhibitions, and
anxieties associated with the past and the future because they force people to
concentrate their full attention on immediate moment-to-moment and day-to-day
needs.
The widespread sharing of danger, loss, and deprivation produces
an intimate, primary group solidarity among survivors, which overcomes social
isolation and provides a channel for intimate communication and expression and
a major source of physical and emotional support and reassurance. The capacity
of human societies under severe stress situations to contract from a highly elaborated
set of secondary group organizations to a kind of universal primary group (family-




Disasters are profoundly dramatic events, and as such absorb peoples
attention; provide a medium for the build-up and release of emotions, and become
collective representations or symbols by which past, present, and future happenings
become rated and dated, Much of the dramatic effect of disasters results from the
fact that they compress social processes into a short time span, making them more
visible than in normal times -- and provide a socially sanctioned opportunity to
act out basic human needs.
All of these adaptive mechanisms in disaster-struck societies help
explain why communities rebound so dramatically from the disruptive and destructive
effects of disaster.
When Panic Can Occur
While the panic stereotype which describes human behavior in a disaster
situation is commonly a false conception, there are times when genuine panic may
occur. So that actual panic may be recognized, the circumstances surrounding or
precipitating this condition should be familiar to the P.I.O. Fritz and Williams
while associated with the Committee on Disaster Studies of the National Academy
of Sciences — National Research Council listed the following conditions under
which panic is most likely to occur:
1. When people perceive an immediate, severe danger.
2. When they believe there is only one or at best a limited





3. When they believe those escape routes are closing (not
closed) so that escape must be made quickly.
4. When there is a lack of communication to keep them informed of
the situation.
Coordination And Control
From what has been presented concerning human behavior in disaster,
it is understandable why control and coordination during the rescue and relief period
in a disaster are difficult to achieve. As has been noted, the amount of confusion in
disasters is often overemphasized; nevertheless, it does exist to some degree. There
are a number of factors which give root to this confusion.
- The physical disorganization of the disaster-stricken area.
- Darkness, if the rescue and relief effort is condic ted at night.
- The effects of convergence behavior.
- A great sense of urgency to act, to get something done to help
the victims, which makes taking the time to communicate and
coordinate decisions seem a luxury.
- The fact that under stress it is difficult to exercise the more
complex intellectual processes, such as looking ahead and think-
ing about the indirect consequences of a decision — except for
the highly trained and experienced and those few individuals who
become unusually efficient in crisis.
- Lack of workable, pre-existing plans on a community-wide basis.
- Inadequate communication, partly because of the destruction of
communication facilities, but more generally because of inadequate
and improper use of these facilities.
- Ambiguity concerning what official or agency has the authority
for certain decisions.





- The absence of an agreed-upon, understood division of labor among
different groups and agencies.
- The occurrence sometimes (though not as often as rumors would
suggest) of disputes concerning authority, responsibilities, and
jurisdictions.
- The lack of systematic reconnaissance and other procedures for
maintaining a central strategic over-view of the problem.
- The lack of essential central coordinating mechanisms such as means
of coordinating requests for supplies.
Conclusion
Disasters present a great many problems in human management, but they
are not insurmountable ones. An increased number of research studies, particularly
in recent years, have served to identify many of the functional and dysfunctional
human actions in the different phases of disaster. In so doing they have provided
disaster workers, with a more adequate base for anticipating and understanding human
needs and reactions. More importantly, they have provided information on which







PUBLIC RELATIONS AND DISASTER
There are a number of highly skilled people professionally trained in
public relations. Some of them are experts on the specific problems of public
relations in disaster. Primarily these individuals come from civilian organizations,
government agencies, and components of the armed services which have either
experienced disaster or recognize the possibility of it occurring.
An examination of what some experts have said about public relations in
disaster provides partial basis for later recommendations. The public relations
plans and activities of certain organizations offer guidelines for similar undertakings
within the United States Navy.
Why PR in a Disaster
We have said that disaster is an abnormal event which is inherently
newsworthy. The public wants to know what has happened, when it happened, where
it happened and most importantly, why it happened. They want to know who was in-
jured, who was killed, who were the heroes, and who was to blame. In the case of a
government agency or military service, the public not only wants to know -- it
demands to know. And in a democratic society it is their constitutional and moral
right to know. It is the obligation of public officials to assure that the right is
maintained. It is the duty of the P.I.O. to assist the public in obtaining the facts,




One public relations expert has recently said "The most critical hours
in a PR director's entire career may face him when disaster strikes, and how he
then handles his responsibilities can determine for a long time to come what the
public thinks of his organization and what the organization thinks of him.'
In the interviews conducted by the author with public relations counselors
and practitioners, newsmen, and military information officers, the concept of
planning inevitably was mentioned. The experts were unanimous in agreeing that the
most important actions taken by the public relations man in a disaster were those
taken weeks or months in advance -- planning. Most recommended a written
disaster plan to cover as many contingencies as could be conjured up in the com-
parative peace of daily routine.
One major reason for a disaster plan is that headlines will certainly
follow a disaster. It is one of the times when P.I.O. will not need to seek news-
paper space or air time. Communications handling under sudden stress is difficult
at best and subject to many serious pitfalls at the very time when positive handling
is most important. Misguided headlines can, and often do ignore the volatile
atmosphere created by the disaster when communications handling is inept or
delayed due to indecision or procrastination. Whatever the nature of the disaster,
it imposes a large number of unusual and sometimes extraordinary problems. It
requires split-second decisions, coordination of effort, and the application of
techniques adapted to the special purposes of the moment.
1Robert L. Barbour, PR Reporter , Vol. 8, No. 16 (April 19, 1965), 1.
2PR Reporter
,
Vol. 5, No. 37 (December 10, 1962), 1.
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Mr. Odom Fanning is a public relations man with a great deal of
experience as a communicator. He has served as the Director of Information for the
Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories in Stamford, Conn. , has been a
science reporter, a public health information officer, and was with the Midwest
Research Institute. He has this to say about public relations in a disaster situation:
Years of public relations can be toppled in a moment under
the stress of an emergency. By running routine publicity,
the media feel that they are banking goodwill toward the day
when the organization has a really newsworthy story. The
chances are good that such a story will involve an emergency --
explosion, fire, homicide, suicide, embezzlement or the like.
Management instinctively recoils at the thought of publicity
on any such 'unfavorable' incident. Management should face
up to the fact that a dramatic happening almost automatically
comes to public attention, and neither press nor public re-
lations man has any option over whether the news will be
published. The bad must be told with the good. Even the
recent President of the United States (President Eisenhower)
and his late Secretary of State leveled with the press and the
people at their moments of health crisis. The space race with
Russia has certainly not been slowed, and may have been
speeded, through frankness in reporting our failures at Cape
Canaveral. The U-2 plane incident — scarcely good public
relations — was made worse when officials hedged about the
facts at the outset.
While media and public interest are assured in a disaster situation,
public relations in disasters are handled in a variety of ways by different organi-
zations and for different reasons.
Disaster PR Means Different Things
To Different People
When a disaster like a destructive hurricane strikes a large community
1Odom Fanning, "Planning and Candor - Key Words In An Emergency, "
Public Relations Journal, March, 1961, p. 23.
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a number of organizations, industrial concerns, public- utilities, relief groups, etc.,
all have their own special PR problems. They all must handle their disaster public-
relations in a different way, ie. , each has its own objectives.
Worcester, Massachusetts, one of the leading industrial centers of New
England was suddenly struck by a tornado on the afternoon of June 9, 1953. This
is in an area usually free of tornadoes. The twister killed 91 persons, injured
hundreds, did property damage estimated at almost $60 million, and left 10,000
people homeless. 1
Contributions of each of the industrial firms affected by the tornado are
too numerous to cite individually. However, each company rallied to the common
cause. The actions taken by the American Steel and Wire Company are singled out
as exemplifying the attitude of all the companies in the disaster area.
Itself untouched by the tornado, the American Steel and Wire Company
rushed 13 teams of eight men each into stricken areas with trucks, bulldozers,
cranes and other heavy equipment along with a fully staffed ambulance. When every-
thing that could be done on an emergency basis was finished on one street, they
moved on to help the next. Similar assistance was offered by many other companies
At the same time their PR men were busy supplying information to Worcester's two
newspapers and four radio stations to inform employees regarding disaster head-
quarters and employment notices.
Elliott B. Knowlton, "Disaster and PR. .
.
,
" Public Relations Journal
,







in addition to community disaster rellel activities, the PR men had otfaei
pressing duties to perform. The economic survival of many individual companies
was in the balance. The Public Relations director of The Norton Company, a large
Worcester firm, had this to say about disaster PR:
There were lessons learned too during the disaster. For
example, public relations men should bear in mind that
first eye-witness accounts of a disaster are the ones that
hit the wires and are most likely to be remembered longest.
Often they can be exaggerated or incorrect, and leave the
reader with the impression that a whole company was com-
pletely wiped out instead of one plant badly damaged. To
prevent large scale cancellations of orders or anxiety re-
garding orders, it is important to keep customers in other
parts of the country correctly informed. PR men should
inform the wire services promptly of the true situation
rather than let newsmen get their reports from uninformed
passersby.
A public utilities company has a somewhat different PR problem under
similar circumstances. In the fall of 1954 two hurricanes struck New England within
a period of ten days. Each one knocked out a quarter of a million telephones. They
caused damage to telephone plants in excess of $10 million. They made necessary
the greatest mobilization of manpower and machines ever undertaken by any telephone
organization. The public relations m£n of the New England Telephone and Telegraph
Company had the special mission to keep the public informed and thereby maintain
confidence in the company.
When it was apparent that a major hurricane was on its way, the







Thomas M. Hennessey, "Hurricanes and Public Relations, " Publ ic
Relations Journal, June, 1955, p. 7.

29
of the telephone damage that was bound to occur from the oncoming storm. Elaborate
plans were quickly made with all the media by the three general information managers
under the direction of the public relations vice president.
After the storm had passed, complete coverage was made available
to the media. Up-to-the-minute TV shots were made available to stations during
the restoration period, thereby keeping the public currently advised of the progress
that was being made. The public relations men were quick to realize that the
colorful and swift movement of men and materials epitomized to the public the all-
out effort and determination to get telephone lines working as fast as possible. In
communities throughout New England, local telephone managers were faced with
the problem of getting the latest information to customers and employees. They
telephoned information on progress of restoration direct to newspapers, radio
stations and television studios. Where telephone facilities were unavailable,
releases were delivered by special messenger.
In the words of the Company's Vice President:
Experience with (hurricanes) Carol and Edna have shown clearly
that the Telephone Company's public relations will not be
seriously or permanently impaired if the public is kept well
informed.
Individual disaster to an isolated company presents yet another set of
problems for the PR team. On Sunday, November 29, 1953 a sudden fire destroyed
80% of the C&D Battery Company of Conshohocken, Pennsylvania. All the sales







had no way of knowing what orders were on the books and what had been shipped.
However, the Company officials decided to stay in business.
In addition to the obvious problem of replacing equipment and arranging
to lease nearby facilities in which to set up production, the company had two broad
public relations problems:
1. Prevent cancellation of orders by assuring customers
that their orders would be filled promptly -- and thus
discourage them from turning to other sources of supply.
2. Impress upon the employees that they would be back at
work as fast as humanly possible -- and thus maintain a
skilled labor force.
To help solve these problems, management turned to its public relations
counsel, who quickly evolved a recovery plan and put it into action. Among other
things he sent letters to the field sales force explaining the situation as far as
deliveries were concerned. The sales force in turn sent in duplicate copies of
orders and notified the customers of the approximate delay in their order. At the
same time letters were sent to the homes of all employees telling them what was
being done and when they might expect to be called back to work.
Many other actions were taken by the PR counsel during the rehabili-
tation of the plant facilities, such as plant tours by newsmen, releases to trade
magazines, special editions of the company magazine, etc. As a result, the
resumption of production received almost as wide coverage as the original fire.
A little more than a year after the fire, an open house was held in conjunction with
John T. Hall, "A Fire Made Them Famous. ..." Public Relations Journa l
July, 1955, p. 8.
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the opening of a new, improved plant. Moral -- the PR man's job had only begun
when the disaster ended.
Groups such as trade associations have a specialized interest in some
disasters. The Insurance Information Institute , for example, won the Public
Relations Society of America's 1964 Silver Anvil Award with their Catastrophe
Information Program. Entitled, "Public Relations in Time of Emergency", the
catastrophe information program was implemented on 23 separate occasions in 1964.
Those singled out for special attention were an earthquake in Alaska, hail and wind
storms in the midwest and southwest, and a series of hurricanes that cut destructive
swaths through Florida and several Gulf Coast states.
To the Insurance Information Institute
,
which serves as a public
information and education agency for the property insurance companies, falls
the responsibility for effectively disseminating insurance information in catastrophe-
stricken areas. So that the insurance business can respond at a moment's notice,
the Insurance Information Institute has mobilized various segments of the insurance
business to execute the emergency information program. It has four basic objectives
which are of particular interest to this portion of the study:
1. To help prevent injury and lessen property damage by
advising property owners of steps to take both before and
after disaster strikes.
2. To advise the public how to file claims for prompt settlement,
and to spell out the steps that should be taken to avoid further
damage pending completion of repairs.
3. To answer press queries about the extent of damage and the
proportion that is covered by insurance; and, through the mass
media, to inform the public about the steps being taken to
expedite claims settlements.

4. To advise as to the types oi damage thai are not oovered by
insurance, so as to avoid the filing of thousands of unnecessary
claims which might clog the claims handling machine r\ . '
In each of the three specific disaster situations listed above, the
Institute's Information Plan was implemented immediately to satisfy the special
needs of each. The Alaska earthquake, for example, posed the difficult problem
of explaining to the public why so little insurance was in effect.
It can be seen that the same disaster may provide different problems
for the many organizations affected and that different types of disaster may require
a variety of responses from the same organization. The important lesson derived
is that each organization must make elaborate disaster plans which include the
public relations objectives for that particular organization in a variety of disaster
situations. Many have already done so.
Brief Description of Some PR Disaster Plans
The American Red Cross
Perhaps no single organization in the United States has more constant
contact with, or direct interest in disaster than the Red Cross. Since it is primarily
supported by public donations, the Red Cross is vitally interested in telling the public
about what it does in disasters. It is highly proficient in so doing.
The National Red Cross leadership feels that public information
coverage of a disaster provides the public with accurate, useful and reassuring
Insurance Information Institute, Public Relations In Time Of Emergency .
A report on results of the Catastrophe Information Program submitted as an entry in




information on Red Cross disaster relief operations. They also maintain that
information widely disseminated contributes to better understanding and appreciation
not only of the Red Cross disaster relief pro- rani but also of the entire Red Cross
organization. And, very importantly, it has been found that proper media coverage
is one of the most important factors in the rehabilitation of a disaster-stricken
community.
It is recognized that a large share of the responsibility for assuring
good dissemination of information within and outside of the immediate disaster
area rests with the public information staff assigned to the operation, ie. , the
information man on the scene. To assist the local information staffs do the best
job possible the National Headquarters provides guidance in a number of ways.
The three basic objectives to be accomplished by any Red Cross public
information staff in a disaster situation are:
To participate in the Red Cross disaster relief operation - Participation
is carried out by informing disaster sufferers and the disaster-stricken community
of Red Cross activities and how and by whom Red Cross aid may be obtained. Public
Information staff should interpret Red Cross program and policy through the various
news and other media and should support the disaster staff by providing specialized
interpretive materials and keeping open the channels of communication with the
community.
To tell the story of Red Cross disaster assistance outside the disaster
area - Publicizing about disaster aid is accomplished by assisting the news and
The American National Red Cross.. Disaster Manual For Public Information
Staff
,
ARC 234C (March, 1962), p. 1.

other media in their efforts to cover the Red Cross disaster story and by providing
information on activities to the Red Cross area and national headquarters public
information offices for dissemination through national media and for distribution
to Red Cross chapters in other parts of the country.
To provide support to over-all (year-round) Red Cross public information
and other educational programs - Support is given by proving human interest stories
photographs, slides, film footage, tape recordings, etc.
,
and by preparing a final
printed report, if warranted, that can be used for educational purposes. *
A number of aids to assist local information staffs and relief directors
in accomplishing these three objectives are prepared and disseminated by the
national headquarters.
There is a public relations section in the Red Cross 1 official Disaster
Relief Handbook (ARC-234), which spells out basic policies and general steps to
be taken, information-wise, in the event of Red Cross participation in a disaster.
In addition there are two excellent handbooks which supplement the
general information available in the Disaster Relief Handbook. One of these is
designed and written to help directors of disaster operations to fulfill the public
information and public relations aspects of their operations in localities where
little or no professional assistance is available. It provides suggestions for the
usual informational activities involved in a disaster operation. Some pattern





activities are included. It is rather like a "What to do until the Doctor Arrives"
manual suitable for small or predictable types of disaster. However In major
disasters where there are no professional information staff personnel on the scene,
a full time information specialist is dispatched to take charge. Very often this
specialist is Mr. Roy Popkin, the Assistant for Public Information to the National
Director of Disaster Services. 1
The non-professional manual, while presenting specialized suggestions
concerning the release of news photos, and how to deal with rumors, etc.
,
is
careful to impress upon its users the importance of building public understanding.
It states that in all contacts with public officials, community groups, media
representatives, and local Red Cross Chapter people, the following points should
be stressed:
All Red Cross assistance is given on the basis of disaster-caused
needs and as an outright gift. This assistance is made possible
through the generous response of the public, which has entrusted
the Red Cross to act as its disaster relief agent.
People innately desire to help themselves. After providing
emergency services, the Red Cross works with families on
an individual basis to supplement this self-help with assistance
that goes beyond the resources of the family.
Where disaster needs cannot be adequately met through local
resources, the national organization provides the necessary
additional resources, including experienced personnel and funds.
The Red Cross seeks at all levels the cooperation of governmental
and civilian groups, to which full credit should be given for their
Interview with Roy S. Popkin, Assistant to the National Director,
Disaster Services of the National American Red Cross, in Washington, D. C.
May 27, 1965.

participation in and support of Red Cross disaster relief efforts.
However, when military equipment has been provided at Red Cross
request and expense, make it clear that the Red Cross is paying
the costs involved.
There is a second guide book called the Disaster Public Information
Manual, designed and written for public information staff personnel, ie.
, a
manual for the fulltime information employees. While similar in design to the
non-professional guidebook, this manual is a more detailed presentation of policy
and objectives. For example, it is more explicit concerning specific responsi-
bilities for coverage during the initial stages of the disaster. It also spells out
the official relationship of the Information Officer with the local Director of
Operations.
Periodic reports of Red Cross participation in disasters are also
disseminated to the field offices. These facilitate the exchange of information and
experiences which help information staffs to further anticipate and prepare for
public information activities in disaster situations.
A catalog of "Aids for Disaster Program Interpretation" is also made
available to all field offices. It contains an illustrated inventory of materials
available to assist the information staffs. Materials available from regional
offices are items such as these:
- Identification posters.
- Directional and location signs.
'"The American National Red Cross, Disaster Area Director's Guide
to Public Information - Public Relations, ARC-1596, (Rev. April, 1964), p. 1.
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- Specialized disaster manuals.
- Films on various types of disaster.
- Slide presentations on disaster procedures.
The Red Cross is not only fully prepared to assist the helpless and
suffering in disaster; it is ready in all respects to tell the public about what it
is doing and is prepared to do.
Civil Defense
In the United States we strive to deter a deliberate attack by maintaining
a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker, even
if that attacker were to strike first. The Defense Department terms this capability,
9
"assured destruction. " In the event a nuclear attack should nevertheless occur,
Civil Defense is designed to limit the damage to our population and industrial
o
capacity. The Defense Department terms this capability, "damage limitation."
The basic goal of Civil Defense, most simply stated, is the survival
of the American population in the event of nuclear attack on the United States. This
is not to say that even in combination with other elements of strategic defense,
widespread death and destruction in the wake of an all-out nuclear attack could be
prevented. One recent Civil Defense Publication states it in this way:
Millions of Americans would die, and there is no point in
looking away from this harsh reality of nuclear war. But
The American National Red Cross. Aids For Disaster.
2





with proper preparations, which arc well within the boundaries oi
technical and economic feasibility, millions of other Americans
would live to sustain the life of the nation. 1
Civil Defense has a large and continuing public information program
designed to educate the public about its objectives and to enlist their support.
However, for the purposes of this study we are interested in the philosophy and




In the chapter, "Preparing for Emergency Operations, " of the 1965
Civil Defense Manual, there is a section on Communications with the Public. 2 The
Office of Civil Defense is vitally concerned with assuring the physical capability
of communicating with the public in the event of attack.
The section on communications states that "Getting official information
and guidance to the public in time of national emergency could be directly responsible
for saving millions of lives, " An Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) has been
established to provide the President, the Federal Government, and State and local
governments with a means of communicating with the public through non-government
broadcast stations in the period preceding, during, and following enemy attack.
Determining the type of information that would go out over EBS and
other information media in time of national emergency and the manner in which it












planning mission. At the same time, am system for emergency public Information
cannot act to increase the crisis level or tamper the Presidenl In bis efforts to
resolve the emergency. Developing the mechanism to meel this dual responsibility
the need to instruct the people without obstructing official } negotiations in an
emergency -- is a fundamental part of the Civil Defense public information
program.
While the plans of the Office of Civil Defense for public information
in a nuclear disaster have happily, been untested in a war situation, they are in
a practical state of readiness. There are information plans for a disaster the
world hopes will never take place.
Office of Emergency Planning
International conflict takes many forms and requires many responses.
The Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Offices of the President has
the responsibility to prepare the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness which
promulgates plans to meet international conflict. These the plan considers under
three broad contingencies: international tension, limited war, and general war.
A common understanding of the factors involved and a clear statement
of the responsibilities of Federal, State, and local agencies are necessary for the
kind of planning which can most effectively channel the energies of this country
where they are needed. The National Plan sets forth the basic principles, re-





meet any kind of national defense emergency. It describes the roles of Federal
Government, the States and their political subdivisions and as appropriate, non-
governmental organizations and individual citizens. The Plan is neither an
operational manual nor a technical guide. Technical plans and operational guidance
are developed and issued by the appropriate Federal agencies in accordance with
their presidentially assigned responsibilities. 1
In the chapter on Government Operation, there is an important section
which discusses Emergency Information. This section briefly mentions the
Emergency Broadcast System and the responsibilities assigned to the Office of
Civil Defense in the event of general war. Of particular interest to this study,
however, are the public information objectives of the U. S. Government in an
emergency situation:
Objectives . The public must be well informed in order to
retain the will to survive and recover as a nation, to take
effective emergency measures, and to contribute maximum
support to the emergency activities of government. This
requires not only suitable means of communicating with the
public under emergency conditions but also reliable and
authoritative information.
To achieve these stated objectives, the following preparatory actions are
listed in the Plan as appropriate for implementation:
Organization and training of emergency staffs at all levels
of government, to be supplemented in time of crisis by
volunteer personnel from appropriate public information
media.
Office of Emergency Planning, The National Plan For Emergency
Preparedness
,
Document No. 20402 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing





Establishment of priorities for the release <>t Information.
Development of procedures for preparing program material
in cooperation with the radio-television industry and the press.
Development of plans to advise all information media on
protective measures, such as shelter, dispersal, and procure-
ment of emergency supplies and power needed for maintaining
operations.
Development of plans to assure that all information for
general distribution conforms to national security requirements.
Development of plans to assist all public information media in
restoring disrupted services and to assure that emergency informa-
tion would be made available as quickly as possible.
It should be noted that the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness
recognizes the necessity of a clearly defined information policy in the event of any
national emergency or stress situation. Other Federal Agencies are charged with
the responsibility of making preparations to insure that the information objectives
of the Office of Emergency Planning are effectively carried out.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
At the writing of this paper, the National Aeronautics and Space Admini-
stration (NASA) has no formal disaster information plan. There is, however, one
being prepared. The plan will generally confirm procedures which the Agency "has
grown into in the last several years. "
NASA Headquarters in Washington kindly provided the author with a




Letter from Walter A. Pennino, Deputy Director, Public Information
Office, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C. , June 15, 1965.
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information contained therein La not as yet clearly established policy. Le. , approved
for official dissemination, it does contain the basic ingredients for the final plan.
Therefore, only basic concepts will be considered here. Such an examination is
totally sufficient in the context of this study in any event.
The Instruction, which will appear as a section in NASA's General
Management Instructions, establishes the policies and procedures for the release
of information involving accidents which result in the death or serious injury to
any person(s), or destruction or extensive damage to government-owned property.
The policies will be applicable to NASA Headquarters, all NASA Centers and
installations, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
An interesting specification, and valuable lesson to this study, is the
one which assigns responsibility to the center director to immediately notify the
press and NASA Headquarters of all accidents on his installation which result in
death or serious injury, or destruction of or extensive damage to property. The
P.I.O. prepares and disseminates the information, but the responsibility rests
with the director. This helps to insure cooperation and interest throughout the
organization.
The instruction also makes a number of other specified procedures by
local installations mandatory in such situations:
Notify, by telephone, the News Room at NASA Headquarters during
working hours and the NASA staff duty officer in non-duty hours
(He is further charged with notifying the Public Information Of-
ficer in Washington.).
While the earliest practical release of information concerning
serious accidents is encouraged, releasing authorities are

admonished to release only established tacts, and not to
speculate as to the cause ot the accident, extent of damage
affect on the NASA program involved, etc.
The subject of releasing names of casualties in every
possible situation is covered extensively. The subject
of notification of next-of-kin, accidents in the public domain,
etc. are all considered.
Casualties at a NASA installation might include military
personnel, contractor representatives, NASA employees,
and visiting observors. Each of these contingencies is
covered in the plan.
Location of the accident is of special interest to this instruction
also, and the release procedures to be taken in each type of
location (NASA facilities, military bases, contractor facili-
ties, etc.) is covered in some detail. 1
NASA's realistic preparation for possible catastrophe is another
excellent example of planning ahead.
Atomic Energy Commission
Another Government Agency with specialized problems in an accident,
emergency or disaster situation is the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary
concern of that Agency is for radiation accidents and incidents. Like NASA, the
AEC has rather elaborate directions for handling all aspects of a nuclear accident,
particularly those which may involve radiation.
There are a number of manuals and handbooks available for the press
and public alike concerning accidents. There are more detailed ones which assist
the information staff in intelligently answering questions. Some of these are:
Abstracted by the author from the NASA General Management




- Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience. 1
- Radiological Emergency Procedures for the Non-Specialist.
- Reporting and Investigating Accidents and Radiation Exposures
(Handbook).
- Technical Information Bulletin on Atomic Weapon Accident
Hazards, Precautions and Procedures.
- Joint Statement by Department of Defense and Atomic Energy
Commission Concerning Nuclear Accidents (Department of
Defense News Release 124-58).
Rather than dissect these documents, it is of greater profit to examine
the AEC's philosophy on the release of information concerning accidents. This
information has been obtained from public statements, internal AEC Memorandums,
and correspondence with the Division of Public Information, AEC.
Mr. Duncan Clark, Director of the Division of Information, AEC, in
remarks before the Seventh Annual Naval Reserve Nuclear Science Seminar dis-
cussed public information in radiation accidents. While the speech was made some
six years ago, the author has received assurance that the remarks contained therein
still constitute guidlines currently in effect. In his opening remarks Mr. Clark
said:
The function of a Government information man is to provide useful
facts to the public news media as quickly, as completely and as
accurately as possible, and not to attempt to control opinions about
those facts. The temptation to avoid criticism or embarrassment
This particularly candid document is a statistical digest of accident
information for the period 1943-64. The data pertains to both the Manhattan Engineer
District as well as to the AEC. Publication No. 20402 (Washington: U. S. Govern-





by telling only pari of the Btory or by sugar-coating it can be
strong. This temptation, however should be ii rmlv resisted
in connection with any work that is financed by the money from
the general tax-payer. The embarrassment involved In admit-
ting an error candidly is small compared to that which results
if you are caught trying to hide or minimize it, and your at-
tempted evasion is held up before the public. A radiation
accident, for example, is an unpleasant fact of life which
must be faced up to. There is no public relations magic that
can make it fade away, or reduce the legitimate interest of
the news media in telling the public about it. The most
important idea that I hope to leave with you is that the best
way to handle the informational aspects of such an accident is
simply to tell the truth about it.
The philosophy of the AEC may be further recognized in the following
general policy guidelines concerning public information and nuclear accidents:
Work to educate the public concerning radiation on a con-
tinuing basis. An importan; aspect of this educational ef-
fort is the informing of local news media and of local
authorities.
A disaster plan should be worked out in advance.
Get the information out as quickly as possible and completely
as possible concerning any accident.
Work with the reporters, not against them.
Be sure of the facts before they are issued.
Remember that the really fast media are the radio and
television -- it is vital to get the information to these media
to prevent undue public alarm.
Make sure the information issued publicly is consistent.
-"-Duncan C. Clark, Public Information in Radiation Accidents, remarks
delivered before the Seventh Annual Naval Reserve Nuclear Science Seminar, Brook-
haven National Laboratory, Upton, I. I., New York, Sept. 18, 1959.
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If the accident is away from the normal Issuance point
for news, keep communications open between the accident
site and the home installation.
Remember that any action taken during an emergency may be
reported publicly and have considerable influence in the news
treatment of the accident.
Whenever possible, it is best to rely on the judgement of
experienced public information officers. *
One practical result of the AEC's public information philosophy is an
information kit jointly prepared by the AEC, Department of Defense, and Armed
Services. Commonly referred to as the "Broken Arrow Kit" it treats in detail the
public information actions to be taken in the event of a nuclear accident. It is of
particular interest to the military P.I.O. It contains a number of helpful documents
and samples to quickly assist the P.I.O. in the event of an accident.
- The Basic Nuclear Accident Information Plan for the Department
of Defense.
- Instructions concerning the release of information when more
than one service is involved in accidents or incidents.
- Nuclear Weapons Safety Guide.
- Background material — Basic Facts on Radiation and Radio-
active Fallout.
- The Technical Information Bulletin on Atomic Weapon Ac-
cident Hazards, Precautions and Procedure.
- Sample grid map for air crashes.
- Seven sample releases covering most contingencies in a nuclear
accident.
The Broken Arrow Kit is held on an unclassified basis by a number of





The philosophy and activities of tin AJ C Berve to Illustrate what can be
done to adequately prepare for a possible disaster situation. The AEC has done an
intelligent job of preparation. Their activities in this area arc worthy of special
note and emulation.
The Department of Defense and the Armed Services
The Department of Defense (DOD) formulates all basic policy regarding
the release of information by the armed services. The armed services, in turn
disseminate their own policy instructions based on basic DOD directives. There
is no master disaster plan issued by the Department of Defense, or by any of the
armed services. Since the military services, individually and collectively, are
subject to all the many types of natural and man-made disaster, the lack of a
master plan is understandable. The AEC and NASA, for instance, operate in
limited areas of specialized activities with predictable accident situations. In-
dividual military commands can by the same token anticipate certain disasters
peculiar to their specialized operations.
DOD and the services do provide basic guidance to component commands
concerning the general policy concerning release of accident or disaster information.
DOD has issued three basic Directives on which individual service guidance is
based in the area of disaster information:
DOD Directive 5200. 6: Policy Governing the Custody, Use
and Preservation of Department of Defense Official Information
Which requires Protection in the Public Interest.
DOD Directive 5230. 13: Principles of Public Information Policy.
DOD Directive 5410. 1: Release of Information Concerning Military
Personnel involved in Accidents.
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Each service, in turn has prepared a basic set of Informal ion Policy Directives
best suited to their individual needs. The Army policies are contained in Army
Regulations
;
1 Navy policies are in the U. S. Navy Public Information Manual; 2 and
Air Force policies are in a manual entitled, Information Policies and Procedures
.
3
Individual commands, bases, installations, fleets, etc. reissue policy
guidance best suited to their individual needs and circumstances based on these basic
service guides.
Disaster plans such as those discussed earlier in this chapter are, therefore,
the optional responsibility of local commands. While it was not possible to poll all
military commands concerning the existence of such individual plans, research by
the author through questionnaire and interview, indicate that very few individual
Naval commands have prepared such a plan.
The Office of Information, Secretary of the Air Force (SAFOI) in Washington,
D. C. has designed an accident folder to assist its Information Duty Officers.
Called a "Colonels Kit", it is prepared in a heavy briefcase -like folder and distributed
in duplicate to each Colonel who reports for SAFOI duty. One copy is kept in the
Colonel's Pentagon desk, the other at home. This kit contains the following helpful
materials
:
Department of the Army, Army Regulations No. 360-5; Public Information,
General Policies
,
TAGO 932A, August, 1961.
2
Department of the Navy, U. S. Navy Public Information Manual, Navexos
P-1035 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
3
Department of the Air Force, Information Policies and Procedures, AFM
190-4, November 20, 1964.
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An interoffice memorandum spelling out latest Air Force
policies for the Implementation of information activities
during Air Force assistance in U. S. civil emergency or
disaster.
A regulation outlining Air Force responsibilities in matters
pertaining to civil defense and other domestic emergencies.
Organization and mission of the Continental Air Command.
Worldwide directory of Air Force Information Officers.
The Air Force regulation concerning information coverage
of Air Force disaster relief and other humanitarian missions.
Regulation concerning information pictorial activities.
Regulation concerning the use of military carriers for public
affairs purposes.
Regulation concerning release of information on accidents.
Regulation concerning off-base aircraft, missile, ground,
water, and explosive accidents: emergency assistance, and
community relations.
A list of Army Information Officers at major U. S. commands.
Map showing major, active. Air Force Installations in the
Continental U. S.
This excellent kit permits a single duty officer to handle the initial
informational phases of an accident or disaster situation in an intelligent manner.
It also permits him to initiate a number of actions to insure the best possible
cooperation with the media. It is an excellent example of planning ahead.
Conclusion
In this chapter the author has presented counsel and advice concerning
informational activities in a disaster voiced by a number of experienced experts; the
specific actions taken by a number of organizations; and the current disaster plans

and informational philosophies of organizations accutely aware of the possibility
of serious accident or mishap.
From the evidence thus presented it becomes obvious that the actions
taken before disaster occurs are often the most important. When disaster strikes,
the organizations which have planned to meet the informational requirements are
the ones which most effectively survive public scrutiny. Perhaps the two most
important words to remember in a disaster situation are — Planning and Candor .

CHAPTER III
LESSONS FROM PAST NAVAL DISASTERS
It is helpful and comforting to discuss successes in the handling of public
relations in past naval disasters. However, it is probably more important to
scrutinize the reasons for failure. This study does both.
The following are the research components of this portion of the study:
Examination of Navy files.
Examination of Navy disaster case studies.
Interviews with military P.I. O. 's, newsmen, civilian public
relations men, and government information specialists.
An open-end questionnaire (Appendix C) was sent to 63 retired and
active duty Navy P.I.O. 's with an average of over 13 years active
duty experience.
Due to the number of naval disasters studied by the author, cited in
interviews, and referenced by questionnaires it is not possible to treat each one
individually. A detailed discussion of one or more selected case studies would not
be useful since many exemplify certain good or bad practices, but not all. In
any event, a number of detailed case studies are available from other sources
and are listed in the bibliography.
The gauge of success or failure is difficult to measure. In the Navy
success means competence in carrying out the assigned mission; performing
according to ones rank and responsibility; reflecting one's own personal ex-




Research (mentioned above) has shown that there arc a number oi factors
common to all disasters which Influence the success or failure oi disaster public
relations. Each of these factors is discussed individually. All are applicable
to public relations in any naval disaster.
Factors Influencing Public Relations
In Naval Disaster
Public Relations Disaster Plan
One factor stongly influencing the success or failure of public relations
problems in a naval disaster is the existence of a written disaster plan. Each person
polled or interviewed readily admitted the advisability of such a plan.
One Navy P.I.O. with 21 years experience was personally familiar with
two similar disasters which occurred within eight months of one another and was
able to make meaningful comments in regard to the worth of disaster plans. His
comments concerned the explosions on board two aircraft carriers.
On October 16, 1953 the USS LEYTE suffered an explosion in her port
catapult machinery room. At the time she was docked in the Boston Naval Ship-
yard. Thirty-seven military personnel and civilian workers were killed and
twenty-eight injured. * In the initial hours of the disaster there was a great deal
of confusion regarding public information activities concerned with the disaster.
There were a number of unfortunate incidents involving the media with crewmembers,
workmen, and armed sentries. Marines physically removed newsmen from the
Boston Daily Globe, October 17, 1953, p. 1.
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ship, cameras belonging to civilian photographers were Impounded, and some
newsmen were threatened with loaded weapons. Wives, fiances and others
close to LEYTE men were refused entry to the base, and were given neither
information nor a place to wait. 1 Within a few hours many of the problems
were taken care of, but not before much irreparable harm had been done.
On May 26, 1954 the USS BENNINGTON was steaming 75 miles south of
Newport, R. I. when she was shaken by a series of violent explosions. Metal
ladders and hatches on the port side in the vicinity of the forward elevator were
twisted and torn to shreds. There were 103 men killed and over 100 injured. 2
The public relations actions taken in the BENNINGTON disaster were
considered outstanding by the Navy Department. Proof of this is the fact that a
case study outlining the public relations aspects of the BENNINGTON disaster
has been disseminated throughout the Navy as guidance for public relations handling
of Naval disasters.
Lessons learned from the LEYTE disaster were obviously applied to
similar problems encountered after the BENNINGTON explosions. However,
they were not merely committed to memory; they were preserved in a written
disaster plan. In the words of the P.I.O. referred to above:
U. S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Training Course- Journalist
First Class and Chief, NAVPERS 10295 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1961), p. 182.
2Boston Evening Globe , May 26, 1954, p. 1.
3
U. S. Navy, Office of Information, Case Study of Public Relations Aspects
of USS BENNINGTON Disaster , CHINFO NOTICE 5720 -- Guidance for public
relations handling of Naval Disasters (Washington: U. S. Navy, Office of Informa-
tion, 1954).

As a result of experiences from the USS LEYTE disaster
just months previously, COMONE's (First Naval District's)
P.I.O. and staff had an accident/disaster plan which they put
into effect. Media were cleared and admitted to the ship
immediately upon arrival. An aura of complete cooperation
between the Navy and commercial news media was verified
by surveys taken later. 1
Preparedness
Contemplating a major disaster is not a pleasant task. The Navy's
operational forces have learned that constant training to meet a national
emergency, peace-keeping action, or disaster situation have paid handsome dividends
when the real thing happens. The P.I.O. must not turn his back on disaster. A
Disaster Plan could be meaningless if the information staff is unfamiliar with
it or cannot put it into operation. One senior Navy P.I.O. who has served in
a number of top information jobs had this to say:
I can't help but conclude that this (disaster PR) like almost
everything else in the public -information business, depends
so very much on preparedness, the same type of preparedness
that a ship's crew must have if it is to meet its commitments.
All too many people in the Navy, and this is true from the most
senior right on down the scale, seem to be of the belief that
P.I.O. functions are crisis functions, and that our load has but
peaks and valleys.
The P.I.O. should train his staff to handle disaster. All concerned should
have a thorough knowledge of the Disaster Plan and be able to put it into effect.
Each individual should know his duties and responsibilities, ie. , where he goes,
Letter from Commander R. B. Phillips, USN, Public Information
Officer, FIFTH Naval District, Norfolk, Va. , June 24, 1965.
Letter from Captain V. C. Thomas, Jr., USN, Public Information
Officer, U. S. European Command, Paris, France, June 29, 1965.
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what he does, what he may be expected to do and his own particular part in
the overall information operation. It would be useful for the P.I.O. to run
drills in the off-duty hours to determine how Ion}; it would take to fully man his
office in a disaster situation. He should periodically put the Disaster Plan
in full operation to find out how long it might take to get out a release or radio
tape. He should also contact the telephone company, Western Union, the
Transportation Officer, etc. to establish the proper procedures for rapidly
obtaining the additional facilities he will need in a disaster.
The P. I. O. who considers a major disaster inevitable and prepares
for it accordingly, will be able to act effectively if it does occur.
Command Responsibility
The Secretary of the Navy has assigned the public relations responsi-
bility in the Navy to Commanding Officers. In this regard he has said:
Commanding officers of all ships and stations are responsible
for the implementation of the public information policies and
programs of the Navy Department and for the conduct of public
information within their commands. Their responsibility for
public information is identical with their responsibility in other
affairs.
He has further said that:
The public information officer is responsible directly to the
commanding officer. . . ^
U. S. Navy, Chief of Information, U. S. Navy Public Information






This responsibility of the commanding officer is no less binding in a
disaster situation. There is probably no time when the responsibility of the public
information officer is more keenly felt. It is also a time when the public informa-
tion officer needs the backing and confidence of the commanding officer.
In a disaster the public information officer needs the assistance of a
great many people on the naval staff. The interest and concern of the commanding
officer will influence the other personnel under his command. They are inclined
to do what they think the commanding officer wants done. If the staff knows the
commanding officer is vitally concerned with the public information aspects of
a naval disaster, they are concerned too. If the commanding officer does not
evidence such concern his staff members may be less than completely cooperative.
Utilizing the P.I.O.
When a naval disaster occurs, one of the most important officers ad-
vising the commanding officer should be the P.I.O. The concentrated media
interest will probably never again be as intense as it is during a disaster. It is
a time when a professional information officer proves his worth to his command
and to the Navy.
The media have specialized requirements either unknown or misunderstood
by most people. All the media are concerned about deadlines. Wire Services
need a quick report in order to get a few lines "on the wire". Still photographers
and newsreel cameramen need vantage points from which to cover the action.
The television stations may wish to set up sound cameras for interviews. After
the initial shock has subsided, the news magazines will want "in-depth" materials.
The list of such specialized needs is endless.
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To someone other than the P.I.O. these special requirements may appear
to be nuisance requests. The P.I.O. understands that these are normal requests
and acts to see that they are properly taken care of.
It is important, therefore, that the special talents of the P.I.O. be
recognized and utilized in a disaster. He must be considered a technician with
an important and specialized function to perform.
The Captain of the BENNINGTON in the 1953 disaster was quick to
recognize the importance of the P.I.O. and to follow his recommendations.
He is a retired Vice Admiral currently serving as the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
P.I.O. Responsibility
It has been noted that the news media have specialized requirements which
must be interpreted by the P. I. O. In this regard it is important to emphasize
the necessity of the P.I. O. to recognize and assume his full share of the
responsibility in a disaster situation. The news media, the public and the next-
of-kin are relying on the Navy for complete, accurate, and timely information.
In providing these services there are a number of actions and decisions which
must be made quickly and capably.
Referring routine decisions to the commanding officer, for instance, can
be time consuming. It is also exasperating to the newsman and to the commanding





The officer referred to is Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr.
,
USN retired. Also see New York Times , April 18, 1965, section IV, p. 5
and on April 29, 1965, p. 16.
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officer. Such a procedure may force the press to seek information on their own.
It may also force the commanding officer to take over the public information
aspects resulting in poor public relations practices due to a lack of knowledge
and experience.
Disaster is a time when the P.I.O. may have to "stick his neck out"
to get the job done. The P.I.O. under these circumstances is acting in the same
capacity as the commanding officer of a ship in battle. There are certain rules
and regulations which must be known and complied with. However, in the abnormal
situation of disaster there are actions which must be taken based on the P. I. O. 's
experience and competency. It is a time when the P.I.O. must assume the
important responsibility for preserving the good name and reputation of the United
States Navy.
Organizing Work Load
The P. I, O. who is firmly committed and devoted to a policy of full and
complete cooperation with the press may cause his own failure by trying to do
too much. A major disaster stimulates an almost endless demand for information.
All the media attempt to get personalized accounts and direct quotes from the
Navy spokesman. Each radio station, for example, will attempt to procure a taped
statement or interview tailored to its individual requirements. This was noted by
one researcher in his study of the USS THRESHER disaster:
Letter from Captain J. B. Smith, USN, Public Information Officer,




When THRESHER was lost, literally hundreds of small radio
stations called the Pentagon seeking to record interviews with
Navy spokesmen. A public information official in Washington
noted that their compliance with these requests delayed their
final decision on plans to transport newsmen to the site of
search operations. *
By becoming preoccupied with certain details, the P.I.O. may neglect
more important issues. In a disaster situation the P.I.O.
,
must organize his
time and facilities. Urgent tasks of importance should of course be handled by
the P.I.O. in an effort to do the best job possible. However, details with a
lower priority should be delegated to assistants if possible. If the P.I.O. is
without help, those less important activities must simply wait their turn in
the line of established priority. The P.I. O. must never fall into the trap of
performing each task in chronological order.
Physical Arrangements
It must be remembered in a disaster situation with a large influx of
media representatives and next-of-kin, that these people are visitors in a strange
environment. They must depend on others for their comfort, transportation,
bodily needs, a place to wait or a place to work. Special attention to these
various physical needs is an important aspect of the P.I.O. 's job.
Newsmen will need typewriters, paper, pencils, access to a telephone,
etc. The next-of-kin will need a place to wait, something to occupy the long
minutes or hours, and perhaps a hot cup of coffee to refresh them. Large signs,
Joseph W. Stierman, Jr. , LCDR, USN, "Public Relations Aspect of a
Major Disaster: A Case Study of the Loss of USS THRESHER" (unpublished M.S.
thesis, School of Public Communication, Boston University, 1964), p. 154.
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even hastily prepared, pointing the way to rest rooms or phone booths can make
a great deal of difference in the atmosphere of a press room or dependents lounge.
They also save the P. I. O. and his staff precious minutes in answering basic-
questions when time is at a premium.
The people who converge on the P. I.O. in a time of disaster are for
the most part, vitally interested and concerned individuals. They should be
treated with understanding and with special concern for their physical needs.
Specified Releasing Authority
Under any circumstances it is highly desirable to have a designated
authority or specified coordinator for the release of information. In the midst
of a disaster it is mandatory if satisfactory relations are to be maintained with
the media and the public.
When no one person is recognized as the official spokesman, there is
confusion among the press, the relief workers, officials in charge, and indeed
among the public information staff as well.
The newsman without an official, authoritative point of contact has no ready
way to distinguish truth from rumor or speculation. In addition, those people
involved in the disaster and the personnel taking part in the relief efforts don't
know who is receiving and coordinating disaster information for subsequent dis-
semination. The result is that current and meaningful information which should be
continually passed to the press may never be released at all.
The individuals in charge of the relief efforts don't have the time or
training to cope with the specialized requirements of the media. When contacted
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by media representatives, they may become uncooperative or even abusive.
This can only make a bad situation that much worse.
One Navy P.I. O. queried, a Captain with 19 years information experience,
had vivid memories concerning the crash of a navy airplane. He had this to say
in regard to a specified releasing authority:
There was a plane crash in a civilian housing area near the
Johnsville Naval Air Station (Philadelphia, Pa. ) in the early
1960's. Several civilians were killed in their homes. With
the Navy rescue and salvage personnel on the scene were members
of the civilian fire department and local police. No one had the
authority to release information, assist photographers, etc.
With no such authority established the Naval Officer-in-Charge of
the relief efforts prohibited photographers from taking pictures,
expelled newsmen from the scene, and ordered no one to answer
questions, etc. . .thus making the worst possible out of a bad
situation.
Safeguarding Classified Information
Every Navyman has the personal responsibility for protecting classified
matter against loss, compromise or unauthorized disclosure. In the event of a
disaster the P.I.O. must be particularly alert to this fact.
A compromise of classified information has been defined as:
. . .a loss of security that results from an unauthorized person
obtaining knowledge of classified information.
The unauthorized person need not be an enemy agent or a spy. The
person may not even know that he has obtained classified information. To cause
a compromise, however, it is only necessary for a person who has not been
1 Letter from Captain J. E. Jenkins, USN, Public Information Officer,
ELEVENTH Naval District, San Diego, Calif., June 28, 1965.





officially cleared for the information to have access to it. An unauthorized dis-
closure can also be the release of classified matter (information, photograph,
etc.) through carelessness, error or wrongdoing. *
Compromise or unauthorized disclosure can easily occur in the temporary
confusion and uncoordinated activity which usually follows a disaster. Very often
medical workers, policemen, civilian workmen, disaster workers or newsmen
find themselves in areas which are normally restricted to them.
While the P.I.O. isn't expected to act as the security officer at the scene
of the disaster, he is responsible for the protection of classified matter which
falls under his cognizance in performing his public information duties. To guard
against disclosure and the embarrassing tasks of confiscating film and "censoring"
news copy, the P.I.O. should provide the necessary safeguards such as knowledgable
escorts and a set of ground rules for press activities at the scene of the disaster.
Most importantly, he should confer at the earliestpossible moment with the
cognizant security officer to ascertain the necessary background information
relative to the safeguarding of classified information.
Cooperation With The Press
Mere cooperation with newsmen will not guarantee sympathetic handling
of the facts in an unfortunate situation. The public has a right to know exactly






Cooperation, however, will often result in a more accurate and un-
distorted picture of the situation. If all the facts are presented as they become
available, carefully and candidly, newsmen are more likely to report them objec-
tively. There is also less margin for error and less chance for misinterpretation.
If the Navy refuses to cooperate the newsmen have no alternative but to
start looking elsewhere for information. In an accident or disaster situation
the newsman won't hesitate to interview any bystander in an effort to get
information.
If the newsman knows that the P.I.O. is doing all in his power to co-
operate and obtain up-to-the-minute information he will prefer to wait for
authenticated facts. He will prefer to hear the facts presented by an official
spokesman or the Commanding Officer. Cooperation works both ways.
Prompt and Continuous Release of Information
One of the information missions of the Navy is "to inform the public of
the activities of the Navy as compatible with military security. nl Navy policy
dictates that all unclassified information in the public interest be released. In
a disaster situation the prompt and continuous release of information is particularly
important. The public has a special interest in learning the facts.
It must be remembered that newsmen are the representatives of the public
at the scene of a disaster. Through their eyes the public learns what has happened,
how it happened, and the other details that are available. The public's first





impression of the situation and the Navy will be made by what they see in print,
hear on the radio, or watch on television. It is important that these impressions
be unbiased and undistorted from the beginning. As noted earlier, it is the
earliest stories that make the biggest headlines, and the first impressions that
are likely to be the most lasting.
After the first stories are released it is important to retain the trust
and confidence of the press covering the disaster. One way to keep the press
objective is to keep the facts coming. In a major disaster the press is expected
to keep supplementary reports coming until the emergency has subsided. If
the media representatives don't receive information as it becomes available they
will seek it out on their own. In so doing they may not get the true story.
The first hours of a disaster are hectic and tiring. The P.I. O. cannot
afford to take a break in the critical hours following the release of the initial
release. He must be gathering more information to answer the inevitable
questions which will follow. The direct responsibility of the P.I.O. and his
staff continues until the interest of the press and public has been satisfied.
Releasing the Names of Casualties
The Navy knows that one of the greatest shocks a family can receive is
to hear on a newscast that a son or husband has been killed, without first having
received official notification. Whenever possible, the Navy protects the welfare




Once the next-of-kin have been notified, however, the Navy attempts to
expedite the release of the names to the news media. This also serves to relieve
the anxiety of the families of Navymen who were not involved.
On naval installations, for instance, the names are withheld until it
is reasonably certain that the next-of-kin have been notified. * There are
separate rules, contained in current instructions, which are applied to the release
of casualty names under various circumstances. The rules governing notifi-
cation are too numerous to list here.
The press is vitally interested in obtaining the names of the dead and
injured. It may be necessary to release partial lists to satisfy local media.
Local next-of-kin may be notified within hours. It may take 18 or 20 hours to
receive notification receipts from families all over the country. The P.I.O.
may wish to release names as the receipts of notification are received from
next-of-kin. This is difficult but it does serve to keep the press up-to-date.
In any case it is vital that the names be double-checked to insure accuracy.
Releasing the wrong name is worse than releasing no name at all.
Getting the names out may require special initiative. On April 26, 1952
when the carrier HORNET collided with and sank the destroyer HOBSON, 176 men
were lost. News of the disaster was flashed across the country. Next-of-kin
of those on board the HOBSON waited for some word of loved ones. It happened
U. S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Naval Personnel
Manual (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 390.
David M. Cooney, LCDR, USN, A Chronology of the U. S. Navy ;
1775-1965 (New York: Franklin Watts Inc. , 1965), p. 897.
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on a Sunday, which complicated the notification of next-of-kin and the release
of information.
The information duty officers in Washington were given permission to
work in the casualty section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel in order to prepare
a casualty list rapidly. The P.I.O. argued that in this case it was humane to
get the names to the press as soon as possible to alleviate the fears and worries
of the families of survivors. He maintained that since most families knew of the
disaster and its seriousness from news reports, they would be prepared for
the worst. In this unique instance, wire service representatives were per-
mitted to work alongside Navy P.I.O. 's to expedite the release of names. While
certainly unusual, this case demonstrates what can be done.
Providing Maximum Access to the Scene
When a disaster occurs it is, due to its very nature, newsworthy. The
news media will want to send reporters and photographers to the scene of the
disaster. To insure complete and fair coverage they should be permitted access
to the scene wherever possible. They cannot, however, be given access when
their presence would:
Interfere with damage control, rescue or evacuation measures.
Jeopardize their own safety.
Violate security.
It must be remembered that there are no regulations which prohibit newsmen
from visiting the scene of an accident or disaster simply because it takes place on
Captain J. B. Smith, USN, op. cit .
2
U. S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Training Course. Journalist
First Class and Chief, p. 50.
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a military installation. If the presence of media representatives meets the
above criteria, the P.I.O. should take action to permit entry to the base or
installation and to allow them to visit the scene.
When newsmen are permitted access to the disaster scene, the newsmen
and the command should first agree to certain ground rules. The ground rules
must be based on common sense relative to the special circumstances of the
situation. To avoid conflict they should be defined in advance of the visit.
The newsmen, for example, might be asked NOT to:
1. Seek interviews with injured personnel or their
distraught next of kin.
2. Divulge the names of victims until the next-of-kin
have been notified, regardless of the fact that they
obtain the information by their own resources.
3. Enter areas which are restricted or which contain
classified equipment.
4. Bring heavy equipment or otherwise cumbersome parapher-
nalia which might interfere with rescue operations or
require additional personnel to carry it.
5. Seek interviews with individual rescue workers or the
personnel in charge of the operation.
6. Wander from the designated access area in search of
additional information or photographs. 1
Once the newsmen have arrived at the scene they should be given all





long as they observe the ground rules set up in advance. Newsmen are, with few
exceptions, trustworthy and can be relied upon to keep their word.
Authoritative Background Information
The equipment involved in naval disasters is often highly technical.
The circumstances surrounding a collision at sea or aircraft accident are usually
unfamiliar to the layman.
In order to report the facts in context it is important that the media fully
understand what has happened. Such understanding may also help them to be
sympathetic in their reporting of why it happened.
Technical manuals usually seem confusing and unnecessarily detailed
to the uninitiated. The P. I. O.
,
in many cases, cannot explain technicalities
or specialized operations. An attempt to do so, without thorough knowledge, can
only lead to additional confusion.
Soon after the initial announcement concerning the loss of USS THRESHER
on April 19, 1963 the Navy Department made certain technical experts available to
answer specialized questions concerning submarine operations. * One of these
was the former commanding officer of a nuclear submarine. This officer, who
himself had taken a nuclear submarine under the Arctic ice fields, spent several
hours providing background information to the Pentagon Press Corps. He also
Based on the personal recollections of the author who was serving in the
Office of Information, Navy Department when THRESHER was lost. The officer
referred to is Commander James F. Calvert, USN, former commanding officer
of the USS SKATE. For details of his Arctic voyages see New York Times
,
April 8, 1959, p. 7.
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appeared in a number of televised interviews. While being careful to avoid
speculation as to the cause of the disaster, he did provide enough technical data
to enable stories to be written accurately. He was also able to dispel a number of
unfounded stories and rumors which circulated soon after the sinking. One
reporter interviewed said these briefings contributed greatly to the excellent public
relations associated with the THRESHER disaster.
The importance of background information was also evident in the handling
of the BENNINGTON disaster in 1953. The official case study had this to say:
Contrary to popular belief, a major disaster does not necessarily
result in bad public relations. From the BENNINGTON disaster
emerged numerous stories of individual heroism and self-sacri-
fice which elicited a sympathetic public response throughout the
country. Editorially and otherwise, the press praised the Navy's
fast action in saving lives and keeping damage at a minimum.
Many newspapers pointed out that such peacetime disasters are
the unfortunate but necessary consequence of maintaining the
nation's military security.
Background information which may seem to be remote or "too much
trouble" in the hectic hours following a disaster may be the most important in
the long run.
Debriefing Disaster Survivors
It was noted on several occasions that disaster survivors were interviewed
by the press without having been debriefed by the P.I. O. By debriefing we mean
a private meeting at which the P.I.O. interviews the survivors to determine their
Interview with Mr. Elton C. Fay, Associated Press Bureau Chief in the
Pentagon, Washington, May 26, 1965.
2
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experiences and counsels them about their upcoming meeting with the press.
Other cognizant staff personnel must also be present to offer specific guidance.
Debriefing may not be possible when newsmen are taken to the disaster scene, but
a knowledgable escort can help the newsman to keep information obtained from
interviews in context. Individuals in the midst of a disaster often do not know
the full story of what has happened. They sometimes tend to generalize state-
ments based on their own experiences in isolated areas of the disaster.
In an operational disaster the survivors may not know exactly what can
be said about the work in which they are engaged. One result is that they refuse
to answer any questions and therefore become "uncooperative", calling unnecessary
attention to the classified circumstances surrounding the accident. There is also
the possibility of a survivor performing his own security review based on an
incomplete knowledge of the disaster or operation.
Certain survivors may be disgruntled about the operation, the ship, etc.
and attempt to lay the blame on faulty equipment, poor leadership, long hours, etc.
The press, who have no way of knowing the reliability of the subject, print what
they are told. Other survivors may deeply resent prying eyes and vent their
feelings on the media representative.
In one notable incident, the crew of a Navy airplane which had been
attacked over international waters by a communist aircraft was made available
before they could be debriefed by the P.I. O. Unfortunately, many officials at the
press conference did not know the specific details concerning the aircraft's mis-
sion or the type of equipment it carried. Rather than disclose that the aircraft
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carried special equipment in the spaces normally accomodating machine guns,
the crewmen stated that the guns had been removed because "spare parts" were
not available. This was a cover statement which backfired all the way to the U. S.
Congress. To the crewman questioned, this seemed the best thing to say at
the time. Navy officials agreed afterwards, that a few minutes privately
debriefing the crew would have been time well spent. *
Welfare of Next-of -Kin
It is characteristic in the Navy to look after the families of Navymen.
The Navy is just as interested in the welfare of the families of Navymen as it is
in the welfare of Navymen themselves. When a disaster occurs, the next-of-kin
suffer emotional anguish and pain almost equal to the physical suffering of those
in the disaster. These people must be protected.
There are a number of ways the P. I. O. can help to ease the suffering of
the next-of-kin. One way is to handle the release of news competently. This
includes the prompt release of information as it becomes available, particularly
the names of casualties, to ease the anxiety of families whose loved ones were
not involved.
Many of the next-of-kin live near the base or the homeport of a ship
involved in disaster. When the first news of the disaster reaches them they
converge on the base to be near the source of information. Handling the next-of-
kin is normally the responsibility of the P.I.O. He should make provisions for
New York Times, June 17 through June 29, 1959.
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these people. They should never be left to their own resources or permitted
to wait outside the gate for second-hand information.
Following the THRESHER disaster, for instance, special arrangements
were made to keep the next-of-kin informed. There was a dependents lounge
set up where next-of-kin could wait in comparative physical comfort for the
latest information. In addition, one of the officers working with the P.I.O.
was designated the Next-of-kin Information and Registration Officer. *
Accuracy
In the turmoil of disaster there may be many temptations to rely on
memory or to make educated estimates in answer to seemingly inconsequential
questions. Newsmen may be pressing from all sides for bits of information which
must be laboriously checked to insure accuracy.
The offhand answer to a question such as, "How many men does an airplane
like the one that crashed usually carry?, may haunt a P.I.O. for weeks or months.
A low estimate might imply the aircraft was permitted to fly with an incomplete
crew. An overestimate might excite speculation about a special mission or
overloaded airplane.
No detail is too small to confirm in any normal dealings with the press.
Checking and rechecking facts in a disaster situation should be standard operating
prooedure. It could very well spell the difference between success or failure.
George M. Hall, CDR, USN, "USS Thresher: Navy Public Relations in
a Major Disaster, " Public Relations Journal , Vol. XX, No. 7 (July, 1964), p. 7.
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In this regard the P.I.O. and his staff must resist efforts by the
press to force the answer to a question before it has been authenticated. This is
particularly difficult when deadlines approach or the P.I.O. is being pressured
by a newsman who is personally known and trusted. Being stampeded into an
answer at a time like this can only result in additional problems.
One important aspect of accuracy is the release of names of disaster
victims. A mispelled name, wrong initials, incorrect rank or rate can mean
unwarranted anxiety or suffering to the next-of-kin. One newsman interviewed
was reminded of the crash of a Marine Corps transport which crashed in the late
1950's. The P.I.O. in his haste to oblige newsmen released the flight manifest
from another aircraft of the same type which was flying a similar mission on the
same day. The identification numbers of the aircraft were similar and were not
double -checked before release. In his attempts to provide quick assistance the
P.I.O. made a tragic mistake.
Honesty
Honesty in dealing with the press is of prime importance. The circum-
stances surrounding a disaster are often negative in connotation and sometimes
painful to admit. The only solution, however, is complete honesty and candor.
Overt dishonesty is generally not the problem. Many of the facts are
readily available or discernible to the press. The problem of indirect dis-
honesty is most often encountered. Neglecting to tell the whole story or glossing
'•Interview with Elton C. Fay, op. cit .
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over certain unsavory facts is dishonest. Failing to tell the press that the
Commanding Officer of a ship was previously involved in a similar disaster is a
form of dishonesty.
Apart from the moral implications of indirect dishonesty is the mundane
problem of being caught. Should the press discover the P.I.O. 's dishonesty,
and they very often do, the facts withheld assume new importance. Since they
are discovered after the basic stories have been written they are singled out
for individual attention. They might better have been factually reported deep
in some original story.
Impartiality
The main objectives of the P.I. O. in a disaster situation are that the
story be reported objectively and that the Navy receive fair treatment. The Navy
cannot expect to receive fair treatment from all the media unless all the media
are treated equally. The P.I.O. cannot give any information or special advantages
to one news medium and withhold it from another. If one newsman is permitted
access to the disaster area, all must be permitted the same privilege.
Sometimes there are too many newsmen present at a disaster to permit
them all to visit or inspect the scene of disaster. In this instance the press must
be requested to pool, or share, certain information. For example, there may be
twenty newsmen all requesting permission to go on board a ship which has been
involved in a major disaster. Although the dead and injured may have been
removed, damage control measures may still be in operation. The officer in
charge of the relief operations or the commanding officer may feel that twenty
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newsmen could not be properly controlled, might interfer with operations, or be
in some personal danger. In a situation such as this, the newsmen would be
asked to select two or three members of the group to go aboard and then pass out
the information to the others on a pool basis. Normally representatives of
different media are selected to insure a cross section of coverage. If one
were a newsreel cameraman, for instance, he would make his motion picture
film available to all the media who could use the film ie. , newsreels, TV, etc.
Once this arrangement is made, the pool members are bound to share everything
seen, photographed, or recorded with all members of the pool.
Good Taste
Good taste under any circumstances is a subjective determination. How-
ever, it is most important to consider in relation to a naval disaster. It is
certainly a consideration that the P. I. O. must keep in mind when releasing
information or photographs. There are no specific rules or regulations governing
good taste. It is a personal evaluation based on experience, judgement and plain
common sense.
Newsmen are generally careful about violating good taste. The news media
have their own unwritten standards which are usually adequate to protect the
disaster victims or their next-of-kin. There are no laws against the publication
of "ugly" photographs or news stories, but each newspaper or television station
has its own code of ethics. The P.I.O. cannot take "censorship" actions to
This is established procedure used by media representatives everywhere.
It is often employed by the Washington Press Corps. "Pool" coverage was noted
on several occasions by the author when he served in the Office of News Service,




stop such information from being taken from the scene of the disaster. He
must rely on the usual good taste of the individual media.
From ths Navy's standpoint, however, the P.I.O. can take action to
preserve good taste. This is certainly true in the case of Navy photographers
whose pictures will be released to the press. A few of the things the P. I.O.
can watch for that might violate good taste are:
1. Photographs of casualties or their next-of-kin when they
are in a state of shock.
2. Details of personal conduct of a scandalous nature.
3. Information which might prejudice the rights of an accused
or a party to an investigation before these facts are brought
out in the open court.
While the P.I. O. cannot stop a newsman or photographer from printing
a story in bad taste, he can provide guidance and insure that the ground rules
previously agreed upon are adhered to.
Keeping Higher Authority Informed
In a disaster situation the P.I.O. often feels isolated. The importance
of the occurrence coupled with the tempo of activities may cause him to forget
the outside world. In striving to solve local problems he may neglect others
within the Navy who are interested and concerned. They are, in addition, very
much involved.
It is important to keep higher authority currently advised. One thing which
contributed to the PR success in the THRESHER loss was an open phone line
U. S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Training Course: Journalist





between the Command Information Bureau in Portsmouth, N. H. and the Office
of Information in the Navy Department. The latest information concerning the
disaster was coming from Portsmouth but there was intense interest from the
Pentagon Press Corps.
Higher authorities are in a position to issue guidance and direction to
assist the local P. I. O. It is therefore important thfct they be constantly apprised
of the situation.
Specific Guidlines
In addition to learning the general factors influencing the success or
failure of public relations in a disaster the author worked to obtain specific
guidlines. Each interviewee and recipient of a questionnaire was asked to state
six rules he personally considered most important; three positive and three
negative.
Their statements have been analyzed, the most significant thoughts
paraphrased and they are presented here in the form of Do's and Don't' s. Due
to the unique and complex nature of each disaster, there is no attempt to list them
in any particular order. To avoid repetition the terms "press", "media", and
"newsmen" are used interchangeably.
Do's
DO - Assume the P.I.O. responsibility during a disaster. This is one of the
times when his talents are particularly needed.




DO - Confer as soon as possible with Navy security experts to establish ground
rules for clearing information and photographs and to provide access for
the press to the scene of the disaster.
DO - Establish an Information Center which is accessible to the press and clearly
marked. Identify this as the place where all official announcements will be
made.
DO - Conduct a press briefing as soon as possible after the disaster. This will
bring the press up to date rapidly and save briefing each member individually.
Announcements and statements should be reproduced and handed out.
DO - Arrange physical services for the Information Center as soon as possible.
These would include such things as extra phone lines, typewriters, paper,
bulletin board, coffee, etc.
DO - Have a brief meeting with the press after the initial confusion has subsided to
establish ground rules of operation satisfactory to the P. I. O. and the press.
DO - Pinpoint the area in which the disaster took place in initial reports, ie.
identify the building by number, the exact floor and portion of that floor
which was involved. This can comfort thousands of relatives and friends
and save many extra phone calls.
DO - Get media representatives, or at least a press pool up to the scene of the
disaster as soon as possible. The disaster is what they came to see and
report.
DO - Provide the press with identified (arm band) escorts. This further identifies
the newsman as being sanctioned to be in the area.
DO - Provide technical experts to brief the media and explain pertinent back-
ground information concerning the disaster.
DO - Respond to each question asked. If no answer can be given, the reason why
should be explained. A "no comment" can be blown out of proportion in an
emergency situation.
DO - Double check each fact before including it in a release or putting it out in
answer to a press query.
DO - Establish a policy line as soon as possible, particularly when a higher
command or other government agencies are involved.
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DO - Establish a working relationship at a level where information will be found,
ie, with the officer in charge of the relief efforts. Also be sure to know
who will be making operational decisions which may be newsworthy. This
will normally be the commanding officer.
DO - Make the commanding officer of the ship involved, commander of the base
or appropriate senior officer involved, available to the press as soon as
possible.
DO - Make survivors available to the press as soon as possible. Debrief them
first. It is best to get this over with quickly and under controlled conditions.
The press will want these individuals eventually, and will go to their homes
if they are not made available.
DO - Treat all the media the same. Treat them fairly and equally. Playing
favorites will only cause trouble.
DO - Be completely honest and candid in all statements within the limits of
security.
DO - Release all information as it becomes available. Holding bits of information
until there is enough for a "big" release is not at all appreciated by the press.
DO - Know exactly what is going to be said before standing up before the press.
Always read announcements. Reproduce and hand out if time allows. Re-
produce after the announcement is made in any event.
DO - Try to view the situation from the viewpoint of the press from time to time.
This helps to anticipate their needs and questions.
DO - Admit mistakes. They will come out eventually. It is best they come from
an official source.
DO - Set up special telephones or Western Union facilities where survivors
can contact their next-of-kin. This is not only humanitarian, but saves
the P.I.O. from answering many individual queries.
DO - Remember, particularly in non-metropolitan areas that the disaster may
be the "big story" of the year. Try to understand why the media are pushing
so hard.
DO - Remember that many of the media representatives are local citizens too,
and may be emotionally involved in the disaster.
DO - Try to stay ahead of the press with fresh information. Once behind it is
difficult to catch up.
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DO - Inform whoever is in charge at the scene of the disaster that the P.I.O.
is present and is assuming his responsibilities.
DO - Keep the commanding officer informed about what is happening; who from
the press is present, what has been said, etc.
DO - Keep higher commands continually informed. Higher commands will also
have intense press interest in their areas and will need current information.
Open phone lines are the best.
DO - Assemble the names, home towns, and next-of-kin of dead and injured on
separate lists as soon as possible.
DO - Provide adequate communications facilities for uninterrupted official and
commercial use. At least one phone line must be reserved for the P.I.O. 's
use.
DO - Be continually available to the press. Once the P.I.O. has established
himself as the official contact, he must be on hand.
DO - Be calm. If the P.I.O. becomes flustered it can only add to the confusion
and can easily influence the tone of the stories being filed.
DO - Work to help dependents, families, and friends of those involved in the
disaster. They are desperate for information. Provide a dependents
lounge close to the information center.
DO - Be aggressive in the quest for information. It is the P.I.O. 's job to do
so. It is better that he question officials than isolated members of the press.
DO - Make reassuring statements in the form of status reports whenever pos-
sible, for instance when all the injured have been removed to a hospital, etc.
DO - Be positive in a negative situation. The media know that the P.I.O. is
working to get information.
DO - Keep members of your own staff informed and up-to-date. They will
perform better if they have the latest information.
DO - Make arrangements for the comfort of the press and dependents such as
sandwiches, coffee, etc.
DO - Be alert to positive stories which may develop such as the heroic work of
relief workers, number of doctors and nurses working to treat survivors, etc,
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DO - Pay attention to internal information on the ship, base, etc. Navy personnel
and employees should know the full true story so they don't relate half-
truths or perpetuate rumors off the base.
DO - Periodically check with decision makers and heads of the relief operations
for additional information — they are busy and may forget to keep the P.I.O.
informed.
DO - Maintain a written record of media queries and answers supplied.
DO - Maintain a complete written record or log of what is being done. This
will be valuable later. Perhaps one person should be assigned to do nothing
but this.
Don't's
DON'T - Keep newsmen peering through the gate by themselves if there is
some delay in admitting them to the base. Go out and explain what
the problems are. Leave some one with them who can escort them
through promptly when proper clearance is obtained.
DON'T - Stay away from the press hoping they will not get the information.
DON'T - Lie under any circumstances.
DON'T - Withhold information or photo cooperation on the basis of "good
taste". Security is the only reason for holding back.
DON'T - Invoke the security ban unless it is absolutely necessary. Never
classify a situation for humanitarian reasons or to cloak mistakes.
I)ON'T - Be stampeded or pushed into making premature statements. Release
the facts only when you are certain they are facts.
DON'T - Permit newsmen to go off on their own. This often results in
embarrassment for the newsman and the P.I.O. This is a ground rule
which should be established early in the game.
DON'T - Give names of casualties until next-of-kin have been notified (unless
accident is in the public domain), and until they have been double
checked.
DON'T - Hold information too long in an effort to get one or two more facts. It
is best to release information as it becomes available.
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DON'T - Attempt to cover up anything that is apparent or easily obtained, such
as, the commanding officer's previous experience in a similar disaster.
DON'T - Disguise reality. Consciously understating or over-stating the seriousness
of a disaster will only cause later problems.
DON'T - Speculate, make educated guesses about the cause, or render personal
opinions.
DON'T - Manhandle media representatives. Instruct escorts and sentries to
notify the P.I.O. if an unforseen situation develops involving the media.
DON'T - Guess or rely on memory in answering queries.
DON'T - Succomb to the temptation to hide even the smallest fact. Something
which appears to be completely buried or unobtainable by the press
may suddenly burst into the open and embarrass the Navy even worse
at a later date.
DON'T - Permit the Commanding Officer or other cognizant personnel to be
interviewed without appropriate P.I.O. representation.
DON'T - Bar the press except for their personal safety or for security reasons.
DON'T - Try to sway the press in the Navy's favor except with bonafied facts
or pertinent background. Understanding the danger involved in certain
operations, for instance, is pertinent to the story. Requests to "give
us a break" are not.
DON'T - Try to pu,t a "good side" to the information. This will only end up
saving the "bad side" for expanded exploitation later.
DON'T - Be afraid to say "NO" if security regulations or the safety of Navy
personnel and the media representatives is threatened.
DON'T - Consider any newsman naive' or inferior. Attempts to ignore, over-
whelm, or impress newsmen can backfire in print.
DON'T - Let the Commanding Officer down. Take over as much of the press
responsibility as possible.
DON'T - Refer a media representative to someone else for answers or an





t up unnecessary restrictions or complicated procedures to Impress
ivy superiors that the job is being done. The smoother the P. I.O. 's
part of the operation progresses, the better.
DON'T - Show favoritism to one medium or media representative. All must
get the information at the same time.
DON'T - Give a statement or bit of information to one newsman first due to
the pressures of an individual deadline.
DON'T - Become involved in things which don't directly concern the P.I. O.
such as handling fire hoses, etc. , except in extreme situations where
it becomes necessary to the relief effort or to save life.
DON'T - Try to do everything and become hopelessly bogged down in details.
DON'T - Feel it necessary to apoligize to anybody, military or civilian, for
aggresive efforts to get the facts. Th is saves all concerned in the
long run, although they may not realize it at the time.
DON'T - Complain to the press about problems with the commanding officer or
personnel involved in relief operations. It will do no good and may
provide some "juicy" quotes for subsequent stories.
DON'T - Become upset by constructive criticism by the press.
DON'T - Forget the manner in which the P. I.O. conducts himself may in-
fluence the tone of the stories about the entire disaster.
DON'T - Concentrate on the media present to the exclusion of those who are not.
One reliable and quick outlet is the local radio station which will tape
and broadcast disaster information.
DON'T - Wait for information. Run it down and get it out.
DON'T - Let the commanding officer set up undesirable barriers to the press
or make arbitrary decisions due to the lack of established policy.
Get on the phone to higher authority so that "guidance" may be sent
down the chain of command.
DON'T - Attempt to try anyone or any cause in the public press. Stay fair and
objective. No inferences.
DON'T - Try to cover up the findings of a formal investigation on the flimsy
grounds that they are classified. By so doing, much good which may






The foregoing sections have presented a number of general and
specific recommendations compiled from the experiences encountered in a number of
naval disasters. It is also profitable to examine the comments and suggestions for
handling naval disasters which have resulted from the experience of one Navy
P.I.O. in handling two specific disasters. It is interesting to note the basic
similarities between the comments of this one officer and those recommendations
compiled by the author from numerous interviews, case studies, and questionnaires.
The P.I.O. who handled both the BENNINGTON and LEYTE disasters
made these comments and suggestions:
Release as much information as possible the first day to
prevent the spread of rumors. This is the surest way to
quell speculation and possible sensationalism.
Keep the record straight by coordinating the releases of
statements from different spokesmen. Try to keep the
number of "official spokesmen" to a minimum to avoid
issuing conflicting reports.
Use the services of the (nearest) District Public Information
Officer and his staff. The District P.I.O. is trained and
experienced in public relations, knows the media represen-
tatives in the area, and has access to the necessary personnel,
equipment and facilities.
In almost every disaster situation, there are many examples of heroic
actions. Rescue crews pulling injured from flaming wreckage,
men risking their lives to save the lives of their shipmates are
both excellent and extremely timely subjects for making good
press in the face of apparent disaster. Intelligent and rapid
coverage of these actions can often turn the tables on a bad




Set up a Command Information Bureau (CIB) ashore if the
disaster occurs at sea. Shore-based commanders should
provide as much help as possible so as not to overburden
the personnel and facilities of the disaster-stricken ship.
Request that additional telephones be made available ashore
by contacting the local telephone company. The telephones not
only enable newsmen to get their stories out, but also allow
the uninjured or slightly injured to contact their families.
Request the assistance of Western Union in handling stock
messages such as "I am well and safe, " for personnel in-
volved in the disaster.
Seek the services of an expert — military or civilian --
who can explain the benefits available to the next-of-kin.
The service should not be established, however, until
dependents and next-of-kin have sufficient time to recover
from grief.
When the Board of Inquiry is convened, try to make it an
open court to prevent news media from getting the impres-
sion that the Navy has something to hide. The P.I.O. should
be an advisor to the Court or should be the sole spokesman
for the court.
Set up a 24-hour watch of competent public information
personnel in the CIB for several days to answer the queries
from news media and questions from next-of-kin.
List casualties in three categories on the casualty list: (1)
known dead, (2) severely injured, and (3) slightly injured.
All names in all three categories should be numbered for
easy reference. Casualty lists should also be labeled as
Alpha, Bravo, etc. If additional names are later added to
list Alpha, for example, then Addendum 1 to list Alpha
should be released. Further additions would be on Addendum
2, Addendum 3, etc.
Give the Commander and the P.I.O. a free hand in releasing
information without interference from higher authority. It is
only on the scene of a disaster that it is possible to evaluate
this type of information.
Set a specific time for releasing the names of casualties, then stick
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to it. Make sure that the lists are checked, double-
checked, then verified again to be absolutely correct.
Conclusion
Each naval disaster is essentially unique. There are, however, a
number of demonstrated similarities in each. These similarities permit ships
and bases to prepare for the physical aspects of disaster. Each ship for instance
has a number of Emergency Bills (Disaster Plans) ie. Collision, Man Over
Board, Search and Rescue, and Abandon Ship. These enable the ship to act
swiftly and surely in the face of predictable disaster.
There are also certain demonstrated similarities encountered in
handling the public relations aspects of naval disasters. The comments and
recommendations contained in this chapter represent the combined experience
gained in many naval disasters over the past twenty years. They are basic to
the planning necessary for successful public relations in naval disasters of the
future
.
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The results of this study have shown that there are certain fundamental
similarities in all disaster situations. The results have further determined that
there are public relations actions which may be taken in any naval disaster.
These findings indicate that while disasters are unexpected, preparations
can be made to successfully combat them. This concept of advance planning is
particularly applicable to the handling of public relations in naval disasters.
The conclusions of this study concerning public relations in naval disasters
are:
To handle public relations in a naval disaster most successfully
it is necessary to prepare a written Public Relations Disaster
Plan in advance.
Due to the size of the United States Navy, the worldwide scope
of its operations, and equipments used, it is not practicable
to prepare an overall Public Relations Disaster Plan covering
all contingencies in the Navy.
Public Relations Disaster Plans can and should be prepared
by individual naval commands and for specialized naval
operations based on predictable contingencies and local circum-
stances.
The lessons learned from naval disasters of the past provide
important guidance for the preparation of individual Public Relations
Disaster Plans.
The objective of this study is to provide documented criteria for the




by presenting general and specific actions which have been taken in past naval
disasters. The mere presentation of past actions is meaningless, however, unless the
lessons derived from them are systematically applied to the predictable problems of
future disasters.
These lessons, therefore, have been analyzed and refined to provide the
basic ingredients for the actual design of practical Public Relations Disaster Plans by
individual commands.
Public Relations Objectives in a
Naval Di saster
One of the first steps to be taken in attempting to solve any public relations
problem is to establish goals or objectives. As elementary or obvious as this may be,
it is one of the first things that is frequently forgotten in a disaster situation. For
this reason it is important that the Navy's public relations objectives in disaster be
recognized as the basic ingredient to the Public Relations Disaster Plan. There are
three objectives:
To retain public confidence in the Navy.
To preserve good media relations.
To protect and promote the welfare of Navy personnel and their families. 1
In addition to these objectives or goals the P.I.O. has certain immediate and
continuing responsibilities in a disaster:
To safeguard classified information and material.
X
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To release all information compatible with the requirements of
security and good taste.
To provide news media with maximum practicable access to the accident
scene and a continuous flow of information regarding the disaster.
To release the names of casualties as soon as possible.
Prior Planning
Disaster public relations experts agree that the key to successful action in
a disaster situation is the existence of a written, previously formulated plan.
In their textbook on public relations, Cutlip and Center have observed
There is one type of event which cannot be forecast — a catastrophe.
But it can be planned for . Every institution and industry is subject
to the fate of disaster and should plan accordingly. When it hap-
pens, time is the key element in the handling of communication.
There is not time to plan cautiously and carefully a program of
information. Plans made far in advance for calamity procedure
must go into action. The on-the-spot planning which would normally
be given weeks must be crammed into a few minutes, or a few hours
at most.
One Navy P.I. O. who made a detailed study of the public relations aspects
of the loss of the nuclear submarine THRESHER had a similar observation:
The time to make decisions on the broad questions of philosophy
and organization is when things are quiet and can be considered
calmly and objectively. When there is no pressure, the public
information officer can often win approval for basic policies,
like full cooperation with the press and absolute candor, that
he might be able to obtain only with difficulty when the instinct




Scott M. Cutlip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations (3rd ed. rev.
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, inc., 1964), p. 142.
3
Joseph W. Stierman, Jr., LCDR, USN, "Public Relations Aspects of a Major
Disaster: A Case Study of the Loss of USS THRESHER," (unpublished M.S. Thesis, School
of Public Communication, Boston University, 1964), p. 152.
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These statements only reaffirm the contention often repeated in this study
that the most important actions taken by the P.I.O. to handle the public relations
aspect of a disaster are those taken far in advance. They also point up the importance
of rehearsing the plan periodically.
Two Disaster Plans Necessary
To best meet his daily commitments and fulfill his responsibilities in a
disaster, the P.I.O. must prepare two Disaster Plans. One, which will be called the
Command Plan
,
would be issued by the command in the form of an official directive
or appended to any master disaster plan as a public information annex. The Command
Plan would promulgate broad information policies and designate overall responsibilities
to staff departments or individual staff billets relative to the handling of public relations
in a disaster.
In addition, the P. I. O. must prepare an Office Plan outlining the detailed
actions to be taken by himself and his staff to fulfill their designated responsibilities.
i
The Command Plan
The Command Plan provides a solid base for the P.I.O. in a disaster. By
being promulgated as a Directive it is officially sanctioned by the Commanding Officer.
It assures cooperation of everybody in the command. It specifically outlines the com-
mands objectives and the responsibilities of the P.I.O. and other departments in the
command. In the absence of the P.I.O. it also serves as a general guide to whatever
officer is appointed to take his place.







Subj: Public Information Disaster Plan
Ref: (a) Navy Public Information Manual
(b) Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual
1. Purpose . To promulgate policy and establish responsibilities for the efficient
handling and release of information concerning base personnel and units involved in
a disaster.
2. Policy.
a. The basic public information policy of the Navy as promulgated by reference (a)
is "to keep the public informed of the activities of the Navy as compatible with military
security. ,r Commanding officers are responsible for the implementation of the public
information policies and programs of the Navy Department and for the conduct of public
information within their commands.
b. The timely release of unclassified information and other actions necessary
to keep the public informed are mandatory in the event of any disaster occurring on
this Base.
3. Definition. Disaster in the context of this Directive is considered to be any
naturally caused or man-made incident which:
a. Causes personnel casualties, whether to military or civilian personnel, which




b. Cause major damage or destruction to material.
c. Any other accident or incident which could be or could become the subject
of press interest.
4. Responsibilities. In support of the information policies of this command the following
specific responsibilities are delegated and assigned in the event of a disaster:
a. Public Information Officer. The Public Information Officer (P.I. O.) is responsible
to the commanding officer for all public information aspects of the disaster including
the release of pertinent information, liaison with news media representatives and liaison
with next-of-kin and relatives who approach the Base in search of information. He will
take the necessary actions to keep the Commanding Officer and higher authorities con-
tinually informed concerning the informational aspects of the disaster. In the event
that civilian relief organizations are needed to assist in relief operations, he will
establish and maintain liaison with the information representatives of those organizations.
The PuHic Information Officer will be the sole releasing authority for all information
and as such will coordinate all reports relative to the disaster. Time and physical
circumstances permitting, he will clear all major announcements or releases of informa-
tion, prior to public dissemination, with the Commanding Officer.
He will, with the assistance of other Base personnel, take the actions necessary
to fulfill his responsibilities. These might include the establishment of a Press
Information Center, Next-Of-Kin Lounge, Press Transportation Pool, Photographic
Team, etc.
b. Security Officer . The Base Security Officer will ascertain at the earliest pos-
sible moment the security implications of the disaster relative to the release of information
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and access of newsmen to the scene and communicate his findings to the P. I. O. He
will maintain constant liaison with the P.I.O. to provide continuous security guidance.
He will, if possible, accompany the P.I.O. and press to the scene of the disaster
and be present at all press briefings or conferences. If the Security Officer cannot
be present he will send a suitable representative.
c. Disaster Officer. The Officer designated as the Disaster Officer in charge of
relief operations at the disaster scene will provide the P.I.O. with assistance in
obtaining information for release and in providing access to the disaster scene for
media representatives and release at the first opportunity. It is important that this
officer provide a continuous flow of pertinent information to the P.I.O. for subsequent
release. The containment of a fire, rescue of trapped personnel, removal of all the
dead and injured, etc. are the types of information which must be immediately com-
municated to the P.I.O. or his representative.
d. Personnel Officer . The Base Personnel Officer will maintain close liaison with
the P.I.O. to facilitate the release of casualty lists in accordance with reference (b). He
will immediately inform the P.I.O. when receipts from next-of-kin notifications have
been received. In addition, the Personnel Officer will provide such personnel services as
may be required by the P.I.O. to properly augment his staff with clerical help, escorts,
messengers, food handlers, drivers, photographers, and personnel to render general
assistance. He will also provide officer personnel to act as assistants to the P. I.O. in
capacities such as Next-Of-Kin Information and Liaison Officer, Communications
Liaison Officer, Administrative Assistant, and Technical Information Officer.
e. Communications Officer. The Base Communications Officer will supply the
necessary assistance needed to augment the telephone, teletype, and intercommunications
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systems in the Public Information Office, Next-Of-Kin Lounge, Press Information
Center, and at other appropriate locations. Where necessary he will assist the P.I.O.
to obtain additional assistance from commercial communications organizations such as
the Telephone Company, Western Union Telegraph Company, etc. He will assist the
P.I.O. in establishing prompt and continuous communication with higher naval authority.
f. Supply Officer . The Base Supply Officer will assist the Public Information Offi-
ce r with the facilities available to his department. As specified by the P. I. O. , he
will supply tables, chairs, typewriters, clerical incidentals, cots, coffee urns and
coffee, food as necessary, dishes and implements, and other items in the supply inventory
which will assist the P.I.O. to fulfill his responsibilities in the best possible manner.
g. Transportation Officer . Will provide as feasible, not to interfere with relief
operations, vehicles necessary to meet the transportation requirements of the P.I.O.
in meeting his responsibilities.
h. All Base Personnel. Other personnel who may be directly or indirectly in-
volved in the disaster are reminded that the P.I.O. is the designated releasing authority
for all information concerning the disaster. They should not engage in interviews, volunteer
information, or otherwise communicate with media representatives except to provide
normal courtesies such as directions or general instructions. If an individual feels he
is the holder of information pertinent to the disaster he should convey that information
to the P.I.O. for coordination and release. All personnel are further directed to




5. Action. This Directive applies to all personnel, military and civilian, attached
to this command. Department Heads are directed to bring the contents of this Directive
to the attention of all their personnel and to make it a permanent part of Department
Operational Disaster Plans. They are further directed to effect immediate and con-
tinuing liaison with the Public Information Officer in order to prepare detailed lists
of requirements commensurate with his responsibilities as specified by this directive.
/s/J. P. Boatright
J. P. Boatright
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Base Commander
The Command Plan would, of course, contain other details in accordance
with the specific requirements of the individual command. In the case of a ship, for
instance, specific responsibilities might be delegated to the Gunnery Officer, Nuclear
Weapons Officer, Engineering Officer, etc. Naval Bases and installations may be
engaged in specialized activities such as the testing of new equipment, training of
Fleet personnel, or support of Fleet units. In each case the Command Plan must be
altered to encompass the disaster contingencies anticipated as a result of the specialized
activities of the individual commands.
The P.I.O.'s Office Plan
To successfully meet and fulfill his responsibilities in a disaster situation, the
P.I. O. must prepare a written Office Plan. This must outline the actions to be taken
by himself and his staff. Appended to this plan would be the specialized information,
check-off lists, phone lists, etc. , which would assist the P.I. O. and his staff to act
quickly and efficiently when disaster strikes.
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The Office Plan can be much less formal than the Command Plan. It might
be promulgated as in interoffice memorandum:
MEMORANDUM
From: Public Information Officer
To: Public Information Staff
Subj: Public Relations in a Naval Disaster
Ref: (a) Command Public Relations Disaster Plan
1. Background. In accordance with the responsibilities assigned this office by
reference (a), the actions outlined in this memorandum will be taken by staff personnel
in the event of a naval disaster.
2. General Action to be Taken . When disaster, as defined by reference (a) occurs
on this base, the Public Information Staff must immediately report to their assigned
posts. If it is not possible to do so in a reasonable time, you are requested to contact
the P. I. O. at your earliest opportunity to report your status (unless of course you are
on authorized leave many miles distant, etc.). In the event of a disaster, the Public
Information Staff may be required to remain close to the office for several days. It




a. Duty Journalist. This individual stands his watch in the public information office
and will be notified by the Command Duty Officer of any disaster. He will immediately
notify all Public Information Staff Personnel of the disaster and direct them to report to
their posts. After the arrival of the P. I. O. , he will proceed to his assigned post.
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b. Public Information Officer. Will proceed to the Public Information Office,
which he will then designate the Command Information Bureau (CIB). He will take the
necessary action to prepare the initial statement reporting the disaster to the media.
This first announcement should be cleared by the Commanding Officer if at all
possible. The P. I.O. will be in charge of the CIB for the duration of the disaster
period.
c. Assistant P. I.O. Will proceed immediately to the Main Gate to ascertain the
situation, which he will report to the P. I. O. as soon as possible. Unless otherwise
notified by the P. I. O. , he will act as the Media Liaison Officer for the duration of the
disaster operation.
d. Chief Journalist. Will report immediately to the CIB to act as the P. I.O. 's
Administrative Assistant. He will take the necessary steps to establish a Press
Information Center in Room 794, adjacent to the CIB. This will be for the use of media
representatives for the duration of the disaster operation.
e. Civilian Secretary . Will report immediately to the CIB and report to the P.I. O.
Her primary duties, at least in initial phases, will consist of establishing telephone con-
tacts with the news media, other base departments and offices, and higher authorities --
the P. I.O. at Atlantic Fleet Headquarters and the Chief of Information Duty Officer --
immediately, and others as directed by the P. I.O.
f. First Class Journalist . Report immediately to the CIB. Immediately prepare the
mimeograph machine and stand by for typing and reproduction of the initial statement.
At first opportunity take necessary steps to establish a Next-of-Kin Lounge in Room
799 for use by Next-of-Kin, relatives, fiances, etc., of the personnel involved in the
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disaster. He will act as the coordinator for the reproduction and dissemination of
subsequent news releases.
g. Other Personnel . Report immediately to the P. I.O. in the CIB for further
assignment.
4. In a disaster occurring on this base the Commanding Officer and the media will
be depending on this office to immediately assume the responsibility for the prompt and
continuous flow of information. This is an important job, and a big one. Your individual
duties are most important to the success of the entire operation.
Respectfully,
/s/Farragut Jones
CDR, U. S. Navy
Public Information Officer
Even this Plan cannot hope to completely detail all the actions to be taken by the
individual personnel throughout the duration of the disaster. However, it does outline
the immediate actions to be taken by each member of the staff and does assign general
responsibilities to each for the duration. It serves to get everyone started. It is
then up to the P. I.O. to adjust his resources and make specific assignments based on the
specialized requirements of the disaster.
An Operational P.I. O. Plan even simpler than the one outlined above was
activated on April 28, 1965 by the P.I. O. at the FOURTEENTH Naval District in
Hawaii. A fire of undetermined origin leveled the Pearl Harbor Naval Exchange
Warehouse, resulting in more than one-half million dollars loss. * It began in the late
Letter from LCDR Robert M. Hartian, USNR, Public Information Officer,
FOURTEENTH Naval District, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, June 21, 1965.
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evening hours. The P. I.O. Plan was activated with gratifying results. The P.I.O.
who handled the fire had this to say about the results of his Plan:
I was first informed of the fire by the duty office, and immediately
proceeded to the scene where I determined that there were no
security problems. I next advised my office, which was fully
manned, of the situation and authorized a statement for release to
all news media. Media representatives were admitted to the
Base (by P.I.O. personnel stationed there by the Plan) and I
took them to the scene where they observed the fire and inter-
viewed, as available, 'people in the know. Having located a tele-
phone on the scene, I kept the line open so that I could pass informa-
tion to my office, where queries were answered and 'stireps' (situ-
ation reports) issued. By 2:30 a.m. , we had issued a 'wrap-up'
story with photos, to all local news media.
As evidence of news media satisfaction of P.I.O. assistance, the
Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District received several
telephone calls the next day from editors and bureau chiefs ex-
pressing their appreciation for the prompt public information sup-
port.
Miscellaneous Information Appended
to the Office Plan
Most important to the success of the Office Plan are the various informational
materials, check lists, phone lists, etc. which will be appended to it. The specific
information and manner of presentation will of course differ with individual P.I. O. 's
and Commands. The type of data will however, be much the same anywhere and would
include many or all of the following:
Policy Materials
The P.I.O. must have selected policy materials close at hand to facilitate




Commanding Officer and other staff officers may want to see specific references
authorizing action. These would include:
Pertinent Naval Instructions both local and from higher authority.
Reproduced excerpts from pertinent manuals, ie. The Public
Information Manual, Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, Security
Manual, Navy Photographic Manual, and the Manual of the Judge
Advocate General.
Sample releases made in other disasters to illustrate what has
been done in the past. Statements made by the Chief of Naval
Operations in regard to the loss of USS THRESHER for in-
stance might prove useful.
Brief case studies of past disasters containing recommendations
for handling disasters such as the one issued by the Navy De-
partment concerning USS LEYTE and BENNINGTON disasters. 2
Background Materials
Background materials will probably constitute the majority of what is appended
to the Office Plan. It may not be possible to physically append all such material, but
a notation stating from where it is available is necessary. Background materials might
include:
History of the command.
Descriptive presentation of the command's functions and missions.
Fact sheets on command and the various ships, aircraft, missiles,
etc. which might be assigned.




U. S. Navy, Office of Information, Case Study of Public Relations Aspects of
USS BENNINGTON Disaster
,
CHINFO NOTICE 5720 -- Guidance for public relations
handling of Naval Disasters (Washington: U. S. Navy, Office of Information, 1954).
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Background on units likely to be involved in disaster relief activi-
ties such as the fire station, hospital, etc.
Definitions of naval terms and nomenclature peculiar to your
base, command, ship, or operation.
List of all material in the command which is of a sensitive
nature or which may require special security treatment.
In commands having specialized missions, such as testing air-
craft, a detailed biography of all test pilots.
Fact sheets concerning normal naval activities performed by
units or ships which could be involved in disaster. In the Service
Force, for example, a fact sheet might be prepared explaining
how ship's replenish underway at sea.
History or fact sheet of previous disasters in the Command.
General hometown information on all military personnel.
File photograph of all personnel.
One minute, 16mm, motion picture film clips of equipment, air-
craft, ships, etc. assigned to the command.
A Navy Job Code Manual which explains the duties of each enlisted
rating in the Navy.
Up-to-date statistics concerning personnel, production, etc.
concerning the command.
Information on any local materials which might cause anxiety
in a disaster, ie. chlorine gas, nuclear materials, etc.
List of what relief facilities are immediately available to next-
of-kin, ie. survivors benefits, death gratuity payment, etc.
Check-Off Lists
Check-off lists can be extremely helpful in a disaster situation. It is impossible
These are available to commands on request from the Naval Photographic
Center, Anacostia, D. C.
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to remember everything when things get confusing. These lists supplement the
P.I.O. 's memory and should be as detailed as possible. No item is too small to in-
clude. They should not, however, be prepared for every conceivable activity. This
can lead to further work for the staff and additional confusion. Check-off lists might
be prepared for the following:
Physical necessities for the Press Information Center and
Next-of-Kin Lounge.
Transportation requirements.
Ground rule items to be discussed with media representatives.
Experts in various activities of the command.
Official reports which must be filed by the P.I.O.
Communications facilities needed.
Phone Numbers
The telephone will be a major tool for the P. I. O. in a disaster situation. He
will want a compact list of the people and places he will most certainly contact. Home
and business numbers must be included.
Careful attention must be given to this list to insure that it doesn't become too
cumbersome to be useful. Listing all the contacts alphabetically for instance may prove
frustrating when a number is needed quickly and the name is forgotten. It is better
to first divide the list into meaningful categories. These might include:
Personnel assigned to the Information Office.
News media representatives and stringers.
Strategic base personnel, such as department head, fire chief,
duty officers, officer in charge of the guard posts, etc.
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Current list of Navy P. I. O. 's worldwide.
Strategic civilian agencies such as the Fire and Police Departments,
Red Cross, Civil Defense.
Strategic personnel in the chain of command between your com-
mand and the highest authority.
Special local individuals such as the telephone company representa-
tive who could assign radio trucks or assist in obtaining open phone
lines — the local Western Union Manager, etc.
Prepared Forms and Samples
In all Navy commands there are a number of prescribed forms necessary to
obtain certain materials or to accomplish certain tasks. In addition, the P.I. O. may
wish to design a number of specialized forms to facilitate speedy action. These might
include:
Long distance phone authorizations.
Navy and Western Union message blanks.
Query sheets for incoming queries with space for name of caller,
return number, organization represented, specific question, time
of call, etc.
Fact sheet for outgoing query calls basically designed with Who,
What, When, Where, Why, and How in mind.
Sample naval message outlining who in chain of command must be
included on all outgoing messages.
Sample request for helicopter services.
Request forms for base transportation.
Forms on which the P.I. O. may make periodic reports to the com-
manding officer regarding the informational aspects of the disaster
to include items such as total queries received, newsmen on the base,
releases made, cumulative statistics of P.I. O. activities and signifi-
cant events since the last report. This would permit a brief report
to be made hourly, or more often, if necessary.
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Sample official letters permitting media representatives to
travel m naval ships and aircraft.
Blank waiver forms to be signed by press prior to embarking
in Navy ships or aircraft.
Sample naval message to ships or remote units requesting
disaster information.
Sample reports to higher authority.
Sample forms which would facilitate maintaining a log or
running description of the P. I. O. activities to be used in later
writing a comprehensive report.
Personnel Augmentation Information
In the event of a major prolonged disaster the P.I.O. will need additional person-
nel from without his office. He must have pertinent information concerning the augment-
ation of his staff. He might prepare a list which would include:
Reserve P.I.O. 's in the immediate area who could come on active duty
at short notice.
Active duty P.I.O. 's within a certain radius who might supply person-
nel assistance.
Names of enlisted personnel from other departments in the command
particularly well suited to function as messengers, escorts, typists,
food handlers, etc.
Names of officers from other departments who might serve in specialized
capacities such as Next-of-kin Information Officer, Administrative As-
sistant, etc.
Names of photographic personnel with the demonstrated ability to
obtain good press-type coverage.
Experts in various specialties who could be called upon to provide





There are a number of physical items which the P.I.O. will need in a disaster.
Many of them are too large or cumbersome to retain physically, but the P.I.O. must
know how to get them and where they can be obtained on short notice. They would
include items such as:
Large maps of the base or command area for posting in the CIB,
Press Information Center, and Next-of-Kin Lounge.
Small maps for handout to the media and next-of-kin.
Large blank poster boards or prepared signs to identify spaces,
automobiles, etc.
Magic markers or felt pens for preparing signs.
A small functional library which would contain useful books such as the
various applicable Navy manuals, Fahey's Ships and Aircraft of the
U . S. Fleet , Jane's Fighting Ships , World Almanac, etc.
Official guest tags for media representatives, next-of-kin, and other
visitors.
Base camera passes for civilian cameramen.
First aid kit including materials for treating minor cuts, etc. This
should also contain accepted materials for treating headache, upset
stomach or tension.
Arm bands or large identification tags for Public Information Staff
personnel.
Name tags and holders for media representatives, in addition to Base
tag.
Shortwave radio in the event telephone communications are knocked
out by the disaster.
"Bull horns" for communicating with staff personnel or media
representatives at the disaster scene.
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Detailed tloor plans or ship blueprints to be used in briefing
sessions.
Public Relations Disaster Kit
All of the materials which the author recommends supplement the P. I. O.
Office Plan cannot be physically appended to the Plan. However, a great deal of them
can and should be.
This study has emphasized that disasters are usually unexpected and that advance
planning is necessary. The Office Plan and the materials used to support it must be
immediately available and ready for use when disaster does occur.
The Office Plan and those materials which can be physically appended to it,
should be gathered together in the form of a "Public Relations Disaster Kit. " The kit
might be any separate container such as a briefcase, file cabinet or desk drawer. The
materials can be periodically inventoried and brought up-to-date. In the absence of the
P.I.O. the kit provides the basic tools and guidance for the office staff and the officer
who may be designated as the acting P. I. O.
The "Public Relations Disaster Kit" is one other way the P.I.O. can prepare
to best meet his responsibilities in a disaster situation.
Informal Disaster Manual
The P.I.O. will need the understanding and support of a great many people in a
disaster situation. In addition to the commanding officer, department heads and other
personnel assigned to assist him, he may directly or indirectly rely on every person
assigned to the command. He should take steps to inform all command personnel
about the basic aims and objectives of the P.I.O. in disaster.
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Even in normal times preceding a disaster, it is unlikely that the P. I. O. will
have the time or opportunity to brief each person in the command. However, one
effective way he can communicate with them is with an informal manual, pamphlet
or brochure. The preparation and distribution of this type of manual is particularly
important in a command which may predict certain types of disaster due to specialized
activities. These commands would include Naval Air Stations, Test Facilities, Training
Commands, Ammunition Depots and the like.
The Texas Gas Transmission Corporation of Owensboro, Kentucky is concerned
about explosive accidents involving its facilities. The Director of Public Relations has
prepared a simplified and easily understood manual designed to "assist employees in
their contact with the press in the event of an accident or emergency." This manual,
"Meet The Press", contains the basic public relations objectives and policies of the
company in a disaster situation. Cartoon-like illustrations enhance its appearance and




What the Reporter Wants
Who Is The Company's Spokesman?
Be Careful What You Say
Courtesy Is Important
"Meet The Press," (Owensboro, Ky.: Texas Gas Transmission Corporation,




After It's Over 1
A copy of this manual has been appended to this study as Appendix C. It is
worthy of special note and will serve as an excellent guide for the preparation of
similar manuals by individual commands.
Summary
There are a number of common factors and individual actions which are ap-
plicable to any naval disaster. However to be properly utilized and applied in a disaster
situation, they must be recognized and understood. It is unusually difficult to make
objective value judgements in the turmoil of disaster. The single most important con-
clusion of this study is that the success or failure of public relations in a naval disaster
is the result of detailed preparation and planning, or the lack of it.
A written disaster plan is the best way to prepare for disaster. However, due
to the size of the United States Navy, the geographical scope of its activities, and the
variety of specialized operations it is not practicable to prepare a detailed master plan
for universal application. Separate plans must be prepared by individual naval commands
based on predictable contingencies and local circumstances. The lessons learned from
naval disasters of the past provide important guidance to be used in the preparation of
local plans.
It is essential to successful public relations in future naval disasters that the






Instruct major commands in the United States Navy to prepare
detailed Public Relations Disaster Plans in accordance with a
specified format (similar perhaps to those presented in this study),
to be implemented in the event of a naval disaster.
Instruct major commands to insure that all ships, units, and instal-
lations under their cognizance adopt the Command Plan or design
a similar plan in accordance with specialized needs.
Distribute detailed background information, case studies and
analyses of public relations in past naval disasters, and continuing
guidance relative to the successful practice of public relations in
future naval disasters to all commands in the United States Navy.
Implications for Further Study
This study has presented conclusions and recommendations for public relations
in naval disaster. To do so, it has been necessary to consolidate factors and cluster
actions to make them applicable to all types of naval disasters. It has been necessary
to present them in a common perspective. Certain of them are, of course, more ap-
plicable to one situation than another. Some of the actions listed may be highly important
in a fire, for instance, and of minor concern in a hurricane. While unavoidable, this
approach has opened new avenues worth exploring. Separate studies concerning public
relations in specialized disaster situations would be a most valuable contribution to
public relations in general, and to Navy public information in particular. Only one
such specialized study has been undertaken. It concerns the public relations aspects of
the loss of the nuclear submarine THRESHER. * Others are needed.
One aspect of public relations in a naval disaster only slightly considered by this
study is the predisposition of the press and public to the news of a naval disaster. In
this regard the Navy suffers from the effects of a strange paradox. Navy recruiters
Stierman, op. cit . , n.p.
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are busy extolling the advantages and comforts associated with life in the Navy. The
inherent dangers are seldom if ever discussed. As a result the public finds it difficult
to sympathetically understand the circumstances surrounding many man-made naval
disasters, while prepared, for instance, to accept the news of civilian airplane accidents.
This is an area which might be profitably studied to determine how the public might be
prepared for the impact of a naval disaster and still maintain the Navy's personnel levels
with voluntary enlistments.
Students interested in public relations in specialized disaster situations, will
find the field almost untouched. The problem of educating the public about naval disasters
while at the same time recruiting them to service is complex and intriguing.

APPENDIX A
A chronology of major naval disasters since 1775. The informa-
tion has with few exceptions been excerpted from A Chronology of the U. S. Navy:
1775-1965, a new book by LCDR David M. Cooney, USN.
The names of naval officers entered after the names of some
ships are of the commanding officers unless otherwise noted. Certain entries
























REPRISAL foundered off Newfoundland. All Hands
lost but the ship's cook.
INSURGENT (36 guns), Captain Patrick Fletcher,
sailed from Norfolk, Va. for the West Indies and was
never seen again; 340 lives lost.
PICKERING (14) sailed fron New Castle, Delaware
for Guadalupe and was never seen again; 90 lives
lost.
GUNBOAT NO. 7 sailed from New York for the
Mediterranean and she disappeared with all hands.
GUNBOAT NO. 159 lost in gale off St. Mary's, all
hands lost.
USS REVENGE (12 guns), wrecked off Newport, R.I.
by careless pilot, no casualties.
GUNBOAT NO. 2 wrecked off St. Mary's. 28 were
killed; 2 survivors.
GUNBOATS NO. 62, 161, and 164 were sunk in a gale
off St. Mary's. 20 lives were lost.
GUNBOAT NO. 46 was wrecked off Newport, R.I.
10 lives were lost.
HAMILTON (19 guns) and SCOURGE (10 guns) foundered
in heavy weather on Lake Ontario while sailing to en-










USS FERRET (8 guns), schooner, wrecked at Stone
Inlet, North Carolina. All hands were saved.
Schooner ALLIGATOR (14 guns}, capsized in a gale
off the North Carolina coast with a loss of 21 lives.
She was later raised and placed in service.
USS WASP disappeared. On this date she informed
the Swedish brig ADONIS she was "standing for the
Spanish Main." Never seen again. 140 lives lost.
GUNBOAT NO. 140 was accidentally blown up at
Ocra Coke Inlet, N. C. with a loss of 9 lives.
USS EPERVIER (18 guns), Master Commandant
J. Downey sailed from Tripoli on 10 July for the
United States carrying dispatches from Commodore
Stephan Decatur, Commander of the U. S„ Mediter-
ranean Squadron, She passed Gibraltar this date,
and was never seen again.
On this same date the GUNBOAT NO. 152 was struck
by lightening and blown up in the Mississippi River;
27 casualties.
USS LYNX (six guns), Lieutenant J„ R. Madison,
with a crew of 50, sailed for the Gulf of Mexico and
was never seen again.
USS ALLIGATOR (12 guns), Lieutenant W. W. McKean,was
wrecked on Carysfort Reef in the West Indies. Her
crew was later rescued.





USS WILD CAT (3 guns), with a crew of 14, sailed
from Cuba for Thompson's Island in the West Indies
and was never seen again.
USS FERRET (9 guns), capsized in a squall off Cuba.
Five men were drowned.
USS FULTON, the Navy's first steamer exploded at







USS HORNET (18 guns), was driven from her anchorage
off Tampico, Mexico by a gale. She was never seen
again. Her crew of 140 was lost.
SEAGULL, Midshipman J. W. E. Reid, converted pilot
boat with a crew of 16, sailed from Orange Harbor,
Tierra del Fuego and was never seen again. She was
serving as a tender to the Wilkes Exploring Expedition.
USS PEACOCK (18 guns), Lieutenant W. L. Hudson,




In the first test of an electrically-operated underwater
"torpedo, " the gunboat BOSER was sunk. The device
was actually a mine invented by Samuel Colt.
USS CONCORD (24 guns) was wrecked in Mozambique




USS GRAMPUS (10 guns) sighted off Charleston, N. C.
,
this date and never seen again. It is believed that she
was swamped in a heavy gale.
USS MISSOURI, a steam frigate and the first U. S.
Navy steam powered ship to cross the Atlantic arrived
at Gibraltar. She was destroyed by fire the next day.
Explosion of guns aboard the USS PRINCETON in the
Potomac River in Washington, D. C. killed Secretary




USS SHARK (12 guns) wrecked off Columbia River with
no loss of life.
USS SOMERS, Lieutenant Raphael Semmes, capsized off
Vera Cruz, Mexico while in pursuit of a blockade runner.
Three officers and 57 men were drowned.
March 21, 1847
June 21, 1848
USS HUNTER foundered and sunk in a gale of Vera Cruz.
All hands were saved.
ON-KA-HY-E wrecked on Caicos Reef in the West Indies.
The crew was saved.




Aug, 24, 1849 USS EDITH, 100 ton Steamer "rounded and wrecked at
Pt. Conception, on the California coast. All the crew
were saved.
Sept. 6, 1849 USS YORKTOWN wrecked on Cape Verdes Island. All
the crew were saved.
Feb. 21, 1854 USS PORPOISE (10 guns) sailing in company with
VINCENNES separated to move independently in the
straits of Formosa. She was never seen again.
Sept. 29, 1854 USS ALBANY (22 guns), departed Aspinwall for New
York with a crew of 193. She was never seen again.
Aug. 23, 1859 USS FENNIMORE COOPER was wrecked in the East
Indies.
USS FULTON was wrecked off Pensacola.
Sept. 18, 1860 USS LEVANT sailed from Hilo, Hawaii for Aspinwall
Nicaragua. She was never seen again.
April 15, 1862 A boiler explosion in USS CHENANGO, in New York
Harbor killed 25 men.
Aug. 23, 1862 USS ADIRONDACK, Captain Guert Gansevoort, ran on
a reef outside Man of War Cay, Little Bahamas, and
was abandoned.
Aug. 24, 1862 USS HENRY ANDREW, Lieutenant Arthur S. Gardner, was
wrecked during a heavy gale south of Cape Henry, Virginia.
Dec. 31, 1862 USS MONITOR, Commander Bankhead, foundered and
was lost off Cape Hatteras en route from Hampton Roads
to Beaufort, North Carolina.
April 27, 1863 USS PREBLE, acting Master William F. Shankland, was
accidentally destroyed by fire off Pensacola.
April 28, 1863 The tug LILY, Acting Master R. H. Timonds, was swept
by tide into the bow of USS CHOCTAW, at anchor in the
YAZOO River. She hit CHOCTAW's ram and sank.
April 18, 1863 USS SHEPHERD KNAPP, Acting Lieutenant Henry Etings,
ran aground on a reef off Cape Haitien, Haiti and was
stripped and abandoned.

June 24, 1863 USS SUMPTER, Acting Lieutenant Peter Hays, sank
after colliding with the transport steamer GENERAL
MEIGS near Hampton Roads during foul weather.
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Aug. 29, 1863 The Confederate submarine H. L. Hunley, Lieutenant
Payne, submerged in Charleston Harbor for the first
time. She was moored to the steamer ETIWAN at the
dock at Fort Johnson. When the steamer moved away
from the dock unexpectedly, H. L. HUNLEY was drawn
onto her side. She filled with water and sank rapidly,
drowning five men. She was raised, refitted, and
remanned.
Oct. 11, 1863 USS MADGIE, Acting Master Polleys, under tow by
USS FAHKEE, Acting Ensign Francis R. Webb, sank
in rough seas off Frying Pan Shoals, North Carolina.
Oct. 15, 1863 The Confederate submarine H. L. HUNLEY, under the
command of the man for whom whe was named, sank
in Charleston Harbor while diving under the Confederate
receiving ship INDIAN CHIEF. Horace L. Hunley and
the seven man crew were drowned. She was raised and
equipped as a surface torpedo boat.
Dec. 6, 1863 USS WEEHAWKEN was swamped and sank in Charleston
Harbor in an unusual tide after being overloaded with
ammunition. Twenty-four officers and men were drowned.
Feb. 16, 1864 USS ST. CLAIR, Acting Lieutenant T. B. Gregory,
collided with the Army steamer HOPE during a gale on
the Mississippi River. HOPE sank.
March 6, 1864 USS PETERHOFF, Acting Lieutenant Thomas Pickering,
collided with USS MONTICELLO and sank off New Inlet,
North Carolina.
March 8, 1864 USS CONESTOGA, Lieutenant Commander Thomas O.
Selfridge, was rammed by USS GENERAL PRICE,
Lieutenant J. E. Richardson, below Grand Gulf, Missis-
sippi. She sank in four minutes with the loss of two lives.
March 28, 1864 USS KINGFISHER, Acting Master John C. Dutch, ran
aground and was wrecked in St. Helena Sound, South
Carolina. She was abandoned.
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June 12, 1864 USS LAVENDER, Acting Master John H. Gleason,
struck Lookout Shoal, North Carolina in a severe
squall and sank with a lost of nine crewmen. Sur-
vivors were rescued on June 15th by the Army steamer
JOHN FARRON.
June 14, 1864 USS COURIER, Acting Master Samuel C. Gray, ran
aground and was wrecked on Abaco Island, Bahamas.
No casualties.
Jan. 1, 1865 USS SAN JACINTO was wrecked on No Name Key in
the Bahamas.
Aug. 23, 1865 USS COMMODORE MACDONOUGH foundered while
being towed from Port Royal, South Carolina to New
York.
Oct. 20, 1865 USS NETTLE, a steam tug, was sunk in a collision
with an ironclad.
Nov. 6, 1865 USS JACOB BELL sank while being towed to New York.
USS ANNA was wrecked on the Florida Coast.
Jan. 4, 1866 USS NARCISSUS, armed tug driven ashore by a gale
at Egmont Key, Florida. The entire crew of 32 was
lost.
Dec. 16, 1866 USS NEW IRONSIDES burned while docked at League
Island, New York.
June 19, 1867 USS SACRAMENTO was wrecked on a reef in Bay of
Bengal. All hands were saved.
Nov. 18, 1867 USS MONONGAHELA, Commodore Bissell, was partially
wrecked by a tidal wave off Frederickstadt Island off
St. Croix. After being stranded in the midst of the town,
she was washed back into the harbor by a second wave
and run aground but was refloated. SUSQUEHANNA, also
present, was not seriously damaged. USS DE SOTO was
driven aground at St. Thomas.
July 9, 1868 USS SUWANEE was wrecked in Queen Charlotte Sound,
enroute to Vancouver, B, C.
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Aug. 13, 1868 USS FREDONIA was driven ashore and broken up, and
USS WATCREE was badly damaged by a tidal wave at
Arica, Peru. WATCREE was carried 1500 feet inland
and 27 lives were lost.
Sept. 21, 1869 USS IDAHO was caught in a typhoon out of Yokohama.
She was completely wrecked, but remained afloat long
enough to reach Yokohama Harbor where she was
abandoned.
Jan. 4, 1870 USS MARIA was sunk off Martha's Vineyard in a col-
lision with the USS MIANTONOHAH.
Nov. 18 -
Dec. 20, 1870 The gig USS SAGINAW got underway from Ocean Island
with a party of 5 volunteers under the command of
Lieutenant Talbot. She had gone aground, and all
hands had gotten safely ashore. The refloated ship
got underway for Hawaii to get aid for the remaining
shipwrecked personnel. The gig arrived at Kauai,
Hawaii on 20 Dec. completing a 1000 mile voyage.
It was wrecked in the surf and only Coxswain William
Halford survived.
December, 1870 USS CHATTANOOGA sank while docked at League Island,
Navy Yard. Her sides were ripped open by harbor ice.
Oct. 24, 1872 USS POLARIS of the North Pole Expedition was abandoned
after being crushed in ice near Etah, Greenland.
June 18, 1875 USS SARANAC, a side wheel steamer, was wrecked in
Seymour Narrows, off Vancouver Island, Alaska.
Nov. 24, 1877 USS HURON, Commander Ryan, was wrecked in a gale
off Nags Head, North Carolina, with a loss of 98 of the
132 men on board. The screw steamer USS ALERT was
also wrecked this date.
Aug. t, 1879 USSJEANETTE, Lieutenant G. W. Delong, sailed from
San Francisco on a voyage of exploration in the Arctic.
With a ships company of 32 officers and men she was
frozen in the Arctic Ice Pack from September 1879 to
June 12, 1881 when she was crushed and sank. The
men took to the boats and crossed the ice pack 660 miles
to the Lena Delta, Siberia where all but 10 perished
from exposure and starvation.
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June 6, 1881 USS RODGERS, Lieutenant Commander Berry, sailed
in search of the JEANNETTE. She was destroyed by
fire in St. Lawarence Bay, Nov. 30, 1881.
Feb. 18, 1883 USS ASHUELOT grounded on the Lamrock Rocks near
the mouth of the Swatow River, China. Eleven of the
crew were drowned.
July 23, 1883 USS PROTEUS was crushed in the Arctic Ice Pack.
March 15-16, A flotilla of American, German and British warships
1889 was present at Apia, Samoa protecting national interests
during a dispute over sovereignty. When a typhoon
struck, the new, powerful British steamer was able
to get to sea safely. However, the older underpowered
American ships TRENTON, VARDALIA, and N1PSIC
were driven ashore as were the three German ships.
TRENTON and VERDAL1A were totally wrecked and
53 American lives were lost. The Germans suffered
91 casualties. Loss of life would have been greater
except for the help of the natives and the unusual use
of American seamen as a "human sail". The men manned
the yards on the NIPSIC, clasping hands, providing a
turning force to prevent a collision with a grounded ship.
Feb. , 1891 USS DESPATCH, dispatch boat, ran aground on As-
sateague Shoal off the Maryland Coasto
Feb. 2, 1894 USS KEARSARGE was wrecked by striking Roncador
Reef in the West Indies. All hands were rescued eight
days later by the City of Peru. Popular demand resulted
in the name KEARSARGE being given to a battleship,
the only U. S„ battleship not named for a state.
Feb. 15, 1898 USS MAINE, Captain C. D. Sigsbee, sank in Havana
Harbor, after an explosion on board. Of 358 officers
and men on board, 250 were killed. The loss of MAINE
was the immediate cause of the-Spanish American War.
The cause of the explosion was never positively established,
even after divers examined the hulk at the conclusion of
the war. Fifty-nine crewmen were buried at Arlington
National Cemetery in sight of the mainmast, erected as
a monument. Her foremast was erected at the U. S. Naval
Academy.
Nov. 2, 1899 USS CHARLESTON, Captain C. W. Pigman, was wrecked






USS YOSEM1TE was wrecked at Apra Harbor, Guam
in a typhoon. Five men were killed.
The ammunition magazines at Mare Island (Calif.)
Navy Yard exploded, destroying the magazines. There
were no personnel casualties.
USS BENNINGTON was severely damaged by a boiler
explosion while at anchor at San Diego, California.
The ship sank with a loss of 65 lives. Although raised,




Ten men were killed in an explosion in a gun turret on
board the USS GEORGIA.
On an unspecified date during the year, the tug
NEGINSCOT capsized off Cape Ann.
USS YANKEE struck Spindle Rock off the Massachusetts







USS NINA, tug, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia and was
never seen or heard from again.
USS MARCULLUS 9 a collier, was sunk in a collision off
the Carolina coast by the steamer ROSERIE di CREGORIA.
USS MAINE was raised in Havana Harbor, towed to sea,
and sank.
The British White Star passenger liner SS TITANIC sank
in the North Atlantic after hitting an iceberg; 1, 595 lives
were lost. The scout cruisers, USS SALEM and USS
CHESTER sailed from President Roads, Massachusetts
to assist in rescue operations. As a result of this dis-
aster, the International Ice Patrol, still in operation, was
established on May 19, 1912.
The Navy's first attempt to launch an airplane was made
at Annapolis, Md. by Lieutenatn T. G. Ellyson in the
A-l. The aircraft was not secured to the catapult and
was thrown into the water. The pilot was not injured.
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July 20, 1913 Ensign W. D. Billingsley, piloting the B-2 at 1,000
feet over water near Annapolis was thrown from the
plane and fell to his death - the first fatality of Naval
Aviation. Lieutenant J. H. Towers fell with the plane
into the water and was seriously injured.
July 1, 1914 Prohibition was proclaimed for all ships and stations
of the Navy by Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels.
Since this time the Navy has been "dry".
March 25, 1915 The submarine F-4 sank off Honolulu, Hawaii with the
loss of 21 lives. This was the first submarine sinking
in U. S. Navy History.
Jan. 15, 1916 The submarine, USS E-2 exploded at the New York Navy
Yard. The explosion was caused by escaping gases
during an overhaul. The interior of the ship was
severely damaged; four men were killed.
July 14, 1916 USS HECTOR, a collier, was wrecked in Dominican
waters.
Aug. 29, 1916 USS MEMPHIS was driven aground at Santo Domingo by
heavy waves. The ship was wrecked and 33 men were
killed.
Jan. 13, 1917 USS MILWAUKEE ran aground and was a total wreck.
July 7, 1917 USS SAXIS was grounded at West Point, Virginia. She
was lost with no casualties.
Oct. 1, 1917 USS MOHAWK sank while on patrol off Ambrose Lightship;
no personnel casualties.
Oct. 30, 1917 A packet boat from the battleship MICHIGAN foundered
in Hampton Roads, Virginia. 12 men were drowned.
Nov. 4, 1917 USS EMPRESS sprang a leak and sank with no casualties.
Nov. 19, 1917 USS CHAUNCEY, a destroyer, was sunk in a collision
with SS ROSE offthe coast of England; 21 lives were lost.
Dec. 9, 1917 The patrol craft USS WASHINGTON sank in Ambrose
Channel with no casualties.
Dec. 17, 1917 The submarine USS F-l was rammed and sunk by the


















USS Submarine Chaser 117 burned off Fort Monroe
Lighthouse, Virginia with no personnel casualties.
USS P. K. BAUMAN, a patrol craft, struck a rock and
sank off the French Coast; no personnel casualties.
USS GUINEVERE struck a rock and sank near Lorient,
France; no personnel casualties.
USS CHEROKEE foundered off Fenwick Island Light-
ship; 28 lives were lost.
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USS MARINER foundered and sank in the Atlantic; no
personnel casualties.
USS CYCLOPS sailed from Barbadoes, British West
Indies with 280 men on board. She was never seen or
heard from again. CYCLOPS was a modern collier
carrying a cargo of ore. Her disappearance is one of
the continuing mysteries of the sea.
The destroyer USS MANLEY collided with the HMS
MONTAGUE off Ireland with a loss of 34 lives.
USS Mary B. Garner ran aground and was wrecked on
Prime Hook Beach, Delaware; one life lost.
USS ANNIE R. GALLUP was wrecked with no casualties.
USS WAKTVA II was sunk in a collision with the SS
WABASH in the Bay of Biscay with a loss of two lives.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 132 was sunk in a collision
with USS TACOMA off Barnegat Light. There were no
casualties.
USS SCHURZ was sunk in a collision with the SS FLORIDA
off Cape Lookout, Florida with the loss of one man.
USS OSTERDIJK was sunk in a collision with SS SAN
JACINTO in the Atlantic; no personnel casualties.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 187 was sunk in a collision




Aug. 21, 1918 USS MONTAUK was lost in a gale off Cumberland Island,
Georgia; nine lives were lost.
Oct. 1, 1918 USS SUBMARINE CHASER 60 was sunk in a collision
with the tanker F. M. WELLER near Ambrose lightship,
two men were killed.
Oct. 4, 1918 USS GEORGE G. HENRY collided with USS HERMAN
FRASCH off Nova Scotia; 23 lives lost.
Oct. 5, 1918 USS MARY ALICE was sunk in a collision with the
submarine USS 0-13 in Long Island Sound; no personnel
casualties.
Oct. 7, 1918 USS WEST GATE was sunk in a collision with the USS
AMERICAN off Nova Scotia with a loss of seven lives.
Oct. 9, 1918 The destroyer USS SHAW was rammed by the HMS
AQUITANIA off Portland, England. 12 lives were lost.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 219 exploded and sank en route
to the Azores from Bermuda; 4 lives were lost.
Oct. 15, 1918 USS AMERICA sank at her dock at Hoboken, New Jersey
with the loss of six men and a million dollar cargo. She
was raised, refitted, and returned to service.
Oct. 28, 1918 USS TARANTULA was sunk in a collision with the
merchantman SS FRISIA off Fire Island Light Ships;
no personnel casualties.
Nov. 6, 1918 USS LAKE DAMITA ran aground and sank off Brest,
France; no personnel casualties.
Nov. 15, 1918 USS ELIZABETH was wrecked in the mouth of the
Brazes River, Texas, with the loss of two lives.
Nov. 26, 1918 USS BONITA sank in Boston Harbor after being rammed
by the schooner RUSSELL; no personnel casualties.
Dec. 9, 1918 Six men were killed and 30 injured in a coal dust
explosion on board USS BROOKLYN.
Dec. 11, 1918 USS LAKE BLOOMINGTON ran aground and sank in









USS TENADORES ran aground and was totally wrecked
10 miles from Brest, France; no casualties.
USS KATHERINE W. CULLEN sank while in tow by the
USS HERON, about 15 miles from the Boston Light
Vessel; no personnel casualties.
USS PICVE grounded and sank in the Dover Strait; no
personnel casualties.
USS W. T. JAMES and USS GYPSUM QUEEN sank after
an explosion in GYPSUM QUEEN off Armen Light,
France. GYPSUM QUEEN suffered 18 casualties.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 58 burned after gasoline










USS SUBMARINE CHASER 343 sank after an explosion
and fire at His Majesty's Dockyard, Ireland Island,
Bermuda.
USS NAY ran aground and sank off Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.
The submarine USS G-3 sank off New London, Con-
necticut; three lives were lost.
The patrol craft USS MARY POPE was wrecked at sea
and sank with no casualties.
The patrol craft USS KATHERINE K. was wrecked near
Key West, Florida with no casualties.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 282 sank in the Pacific with
no casualties.
USS H-l, a submarine, which had run aground, sank
during salvage operations off Margarita Island, Baja,
California; four lives were lost.
The submarine USS S-5 was sunk accidentally off the
mouth of the Delaware Bay; there were no casualties.
USS WOOLSEY a destroyer, was sunk in a collision with















The USS CONESTOGA, a fleet tug, with a crew of 43
sailed from San Francisco to Samoa and was never seen
again.
The British dirigible R-38, constructed for the U. S.
Navy exploded over Hull, England. Seventeen Navy
personnel were killed.
The submarine, USS R-6 sank off San Pedro, California;
two lives were lost.
The submarine USS S-48 sank off Bridgeport, Con-
necticut during a practice dive. The crew of 43 was
saved after one escaped through a torpedo tube to get
help.
The destroyer USS GRAHAM was destroyed in a
collision.
USS EAGLE 17 was wrecked between Amagansett and
Easthampton off Long Island, New York.
The minesweeper USS CARDINAL was wrecked off
Cherikof, Alaska.
USS GRANITE STATE, old frigate, burned and sank
off Massachusetts.
USS GOPHER, a tender, was sunk.
The Point Honda, California disaster. Seven destroyers
ran aground on the California coast in a heavy fog as a
result of a navigational error. USS DELPHY, S. P. LEE,
FULLER, CHAUNCEY, WOODBURY, NICHOLAS, and
YOUNG were complete losses. Twenty-two men were
killed; a very small number - which was considered the
result of outstanding training and discipline.
USS SUBMARINE CHASER 340 was destroyed by fire.
The submarine USS S-51 sank after being rammed by the
SS CITY OF ROME off Black Island. There were 37
lives lost. S-51 was raised on July 5, 1925 and was
towed to the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
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Sept. 3, 1925 USS SHENANDOAH, a dirigible, was lost in a severe
storm over Ohio. The after section crashed, but the
forward section free ballooned for an hour, landing
safely 12 miles away with seven men aboard. There
were 14 casualties, including the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Commander Zachary Lansdowne; 29
survived.
Dec. 15, 1925 The minesweeper USS CURLEW was wrecked when
she ran aground off Panama.
Dec. 17, 1927 The submarine USS S-4 was rammed while submerged
off Provincetown, Massachusetts by the Coast Guard
destroyer POULDING. Five officers and 34 enlisted
men died when the ship sank.
Feb. 27, 1928 Commander T. C. Ellyson, the Navy's first aviator
was killed in an air crash on a night flight from
Norfolk, Va. to Annapolis, Md.
Apr. 4, 1933 USS AKRON, a dirigible, was lost at sea in a storm.
Seventy-three lives were lost, including Admiral
William Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics,
of Barnegal Light New Jersey.
Feb. 12, 1935 The dirigible MACON crashed off Point Sur, California
with a loss of two lives while operating with the
Pacific Fleet.
June 26, 1937 The minesweeper USS SANDERLING sank.
May 23, 1939 USS SQUALAS, a submarine, sank on a practice dive
off Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Fifty-nine of her
crew were rescued by diving bell, 26 were cited.
SQUALAS was later raised, repaired and renamed
SAILFISH. She served in World War II with great
success.
Feb. 9, 1942 USS LAFAYETTE, the former French liner NORMANDIE,
burned at her pier at New York while undergoing con-
version.
Feb. 18, 1942 The destroyer USS TRUXTON and General Stores Issue
Ship, USS POLLUX were sunk in a heavy storm in





The minesweeper USS BUNTING was sunk in a
collision in San Francisco Bay.
The submarine USS S-27 ran aground on Amchitka in
the Aleutian Islands and was abandoned.
June 30, 1942
Aug. 14, 1942
The minesweeper USS HORNBILL was sunk in a
collision in San Francisco Bay.
The submarine USS S-39 struck a submerged reef
off Rossel Island. She had to be abandoned on Aug.
16th.
Aug. 22, 1942 USS INGRAHAM, a destroyer was sunk in a collision
with the fleet oiler, USS CHEMUNG off Nova Scotia.
CHEMUNG was damaged.
USS BUCK was damaged in a collision with a




The weather ship MUSKEGET disappeared in the
Atlantic and was never located; 120 lives were lost.
The heavy cruiser USS SAN FRANCISCO collided with
the USS BREESE in the New Hebrides area. Both
were damaged.





USS GREBE, an Ocean Tug (old), ran aground and
sank south of the Fiji Islands.
The Gunboat, USCG NATSEK disappeared in Belle
Isle Straits, Newfoundland; she probably foundered.
The Navy transports USS NIGHTINGALE and USS
THURSTON were damaged in a collision off North
Africa.
Jan. 12, 1943 The destroyer USS WORDEN was sunk after grounding
off Anchitka.


















USS SC-709 sank after grounding off Cape Breton,
Nova Scotia.
Minesweeper USS YMS-133 foundered in Coos Bay,
Oregon.
The USS SC-1024, a submarine chaser, was sunk in
a collision off North Carolina.
The destroyer USS MAC DONOUGH and the destroyer
minesweeper SICARD were damaged in a collision
in the Aleutian Island area.
PT-22 damaged in a storm was run aground and
abandoned near Adak, Aleutian Islands.
The submarine chaser USS SC-740 ran aground and
sank northeast of Australia.
LST-6 and LST-326 were damaged in a collision off
North Africa.
The USS RONAKI ran aground and sank on the east
coast of Australia.
USS CROW, a minesweeper was sunk by an erratic
torpedo in Puget Sound, Washington.
USS SC-1067 foundered off Attu, Aleutian Islands.
The destroyer USS PERKINS was sunk in a collision
with the Australian transport, HMAS WESTRALIA off
eastern New Guinea.
The destroyer USS TURNER sank after an internal
explosion in Ambrose Channel, New York, with the
loss of 100 men.
The Gunboat USS ST. AUGUSTINE was sunk in a
collision off North Carolina.
LST-228 sank after grounding off the Azores Islands.
PT-200 sank off Long Island, New York after striking
a submerged object.













The rescue tug, ATR-98 was sunk in a collision in
the Azores area.
The coastal minesweeper USS VALOR sank after a
collision off Newport, R. I.
The submarine, USS S-28 sank off the Hawaiian
Islands during a practice dive with the loss of all
hands.
The high speed transport USS NOA and the destroyer
USS FULLAM collided off the Palau Islands; NOA sank
and FULLAM was damaged.
The destroyer, USS WARRINGTON sank off the Bahamas
in a hurricane.
The coast guard cutters BEDLOE and JACKSON were
sunk off Cape Hatteras and Lightship 73 was sunk off
Martha's Vineyard and the auxilliary ship 17 was sunk
off North Carolina in an Atlantic Storm.
The destroyer USS FORREST was damaged in a col-
lision off southern France.
The Landing Ships Tank (LST's) 129, 278, and 611 were
damaged in a severe storm in the Palau Islands.
The ammunition ship USS MOUNT HOOD sank after
her cargo exploded at Manus in the Admiralty Islands.
A typhoon off the east coast of the Philippine Islands
sank the destroyers USS HULL, SPENCE, and MONAGHAN
and damaged the following ships:
Light carriers: USS COWPENS, MONTEREY, CABOT,
and SAN JACINTO.
Escort carriers; USS ALTAMAHA, NEHENTA BAY,
CAPE ESPERANCE, KWAJALEIN.
The light cruiser USS MIAMI.
Destroyers: ALYWIN, BENHAM, BUCHANAN,





Destroyer escorts: USS MELVIN R. NAWAN,
TABBERER, and WATTERMAN












The fleet tug USS JICARILLA
The typhoon cost the Navy 765 lives.
The escort carrier USS SARGENT BAY and the destroyer
escort KELLER collided and were damaged in the
Philippines.
The destroyer USS BELL was damaged in a collision
off Luzon.
The auxilliary minesweeper USS YMS-14 was sunk
in a collision in Boston Harbor.
The cargo ship USS SERPENS sank after an explosion
while anchored at Guadacanal. There were 253 men
killed.
The fleet tug USS TAKELMA was damaged in a col-
lision in the Philippines.
The destroyer USS HARRISON was damaged in a severe
storm south of Honshu, Japan.
The self-propelled lighter, YF-926, sank en route from
California to Pearl Harbor.
A typhoon in the Okinawa area did heavy damage to
U. S. Naval ships in the area. 36 ships were damaged
including four battleships, eight carriers, seven
cruisers, and several destroyers and large support
ships.
USS LOWRY, a destroyer, was damaged by an ex-
plosion in the Philippines.
The patrol craft PC -590 floundered and broke in two
in a storm off Okinawa.
A typhoon struck Okinawa killing 43 personnel, 49
were injured, and 30 declared missing.
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Aug. 26, 1949 The submarine USS COCHINO sank after an internal
fire and explosion while on a training" cruise in the
Arctic. Her crew was rescued.
April 5, 1950 The world's largest flying boat, the Marshall Mars,
crash landed off Hawaii. She exploded and sank, but
her crew was rescued.
Aug. 25, 1950 The Navy hospital ship, USS BENEVOLENCE col-
lided with the SS MARY LUCKENBACH while on a
trial run after being taken out of mothballs for service
in the Korean War. The ship sank outside the Golden
Gate with a loss of 18 lives.
March 2, 1952 A landing craft (LCPL) foundered off Yongpyond-do,
Korea with a loss of all hands. There were American,
Korean, and English officers and men on board.
April 26, 1952 The destroyer, USS HOBSON was sunk in a collision
with the aircraft carrier, USS WASP during training
maneuvers in the Atlantic. 176 men on board HOBSON
were killed.
Aug. 6, 1952 The explosion of a Panther Jet aircraft (F9F) on the
flight deck of the aircraft carrier, USS BOXER, in
the operating area off Korea, caused a fire which ig-
nited gasoline and ammunition. Nine men died of
smoke and burns. Helicopters and destroyers of the
Task Force 77 rescued 63 survivors from the sea. The
fire was under control in a few hours and the ship was
still operational, although 12 aircraft and some aviation
materials were damaged by the fire.
Sept. 11, 1952 Six aircraft (F9F-4s) crashed into a mountain during
an instrument landing in the vicinity of airfield K-2
in Korea. All the pilots were killed.
Nov. 30, 1952 The fleet oiler USS ASHTUBULA was damaged by a
gasoline explosion while at Sasebo, Japan. One man
was killed and three were injured.
Jan. 28, 1953 A privateer patrol plane with a crew of nine navymen
on board, disappeared enroute from Alameda, California
to Whidby Island, Washington.
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Feb. 19, 1953 The destroyers USS PRICHETT and USS CUSHING
collided while operating with Task Force 77 off
Korea. Both ships required dry docking in Sasebo,
Japan for repairs.
Mar. 6, 1953 A bomb dropped from an F4U aircraft landing aboard
the aircraft carrier USS ORISKANY exploded on
number three elevator platform killing two men and
wounding thirteen others.
April 27, 1953 An explosion on board the aircraft carrier USS BEN-
NINGTON off Guantanamo, Cuba killed 11 men and
injured 4,
July 18, 1953 A Marine transport aircraft crashed near Milton,
Florida. Forty-four NROTC Midshipmen and crew
members perished. Two crewmen survived.
Oct. 16, 1953 The aircraft carrier, USS LEYTE was damaged by a
fire and explosion in Boston Harbor; thirty-seven
men were killed.
May 26, 1954 An explosion and fire on board USS BENNINGTON,
an aircraft carrier, off Newport, R. I. caused 103
deaths and 117 serious injuries.
Sept. 27, 1955 A P2V Neptune patrol plane from Early Warning
Squadron Four was lost with eleven crew members
while tracking Hurricane Janet over the Caribbean
Sea.
Jan. 5, 1956 The destroyer, USS BASILONE grounded off Cape
Henry. She was freed by the tug USS ATAKAPA on
Jan. 11 and towed to the Naval Shipyard at Portsmouth,
Virginia.
Sept. 21, 1956 An F-ll-F Tiger jet aircraft shot itself down while
conducting firing tests over eastern Long Island, New
York. The plane ran into 20mm projectiles which it
had fired seconds before at a higher altitude.
May 28, 1958 The submarine USS STICKLEBACK was sunk in a
collision with the destroyer USS SILVERSTEIN off
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. There was no loss of life.
Aug. 22, 1958 USS PRETICE, a minesweeper, was sunk after running
aground off Shikoku, Japan.
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Feb. 25, 1960 A Navy four engine transport aircraft operating in
support of the U. S. Navy Band on a good-will tour
of South America, collided with a Brazilian commercial
airliner over Rio De Janeiro. Thirty -five naval person-
nel were killed, including 19 members of the Navy




The destroyer USS DARBY, collided with the Swedish
merchantman SOYA in the Atlantic off Cape Henry,
Virginia. Two men were killed.
The destroyers, USS COLLETT and USS AMMEN
collided in a fog off Huntington Beach, California.
COLLETT required a new bow and AMMEN was
scrapped.
The minesweeper, USS EXULTANT was damaged by







A fire on the CONSTELLATION, an aircraft carrier
under construction in the Brooklyn Navy Yard killed
50 persons and injured 150. It caused $75,000,000
worth of damage to the ship.
USS INTREPID, an aircraft carrier, was damaged by
a boiler explosion at sea; 11 men were injured.
The U. S. Naval Ship POTOMAC was damaged by fire
and explosion at Morehead City, North Carolina.
Commander Malcom Ross and Lieutenant Commander
Victor Prather, a Navy medical officer, ascended to
a height of 113,500 feet, establishing a world's record
for manned balloons. The balloon was launched from
the aircraft carrier USS ANTIETAM in the Gulf of
Mexico. The flight lasted nine hours. Medical and
scientific experiments were conducted. Dr. Prather
was drowned during the helicopter retrieval from the
sea after completion of the flight.
Installations on the Island of Guam were severely
damaged by Typhoon Karen. Hundreds were injured
and 2 people were killed.
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April 10, 1963 The nuclear submarine USS THRESHER sank while
conducting test dives 220 miles east of Cape Cod.
Her entire crew of 112 and 17 civilians were lost.
April 1, 1964 The aircraft carrier USS RANDOLPH was damaged when
the number three elevator dropped loose from its
mountings and fell overboard. Five men and one air-
craft were dropped into the Atlantic Ocean. Three
of the men were rescued by the USS HOLDER a
destroyer escort.
May 6, 1964 The destroyer USS DECATUR was seriously damaged
in a collision with the aircraft carrier, USS LAKE
CHAMPLAIN off Cape Henry, Virginia. Although
seriously damaged, none of her crew was injured
seriously.
June 3, 1964 The aircraft carrier USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN was
damaged in a collision with the Norwegian merchant
ship SKAWAAG in the Chesapeake Bay off Annapolis,
Maryland.
June 16, 1955 The destroyer escort HARTLEY collided with the
Norwegian merchant ship, BLUE MASTER off the
Virginia Capes. Northeast winds drove the Navy
ship, disabled in the collision, aground 500 yards
off the coast. She was later refloated and repaired.

APPENDIX B
Questionnaire used by the author in obtaining personal observations
from military public information officers, newsmen, civilian public relations




PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING
1. Years Public Information Experience -
2. In your recollection, which peacetime naval disaster was best handled from
a public information point of view?
A. Brief description of the disaster -
B. Two specific reasons why it was the best -
(1)
(2)
3. In your recollection, which peacetime naval disaster was the worst from a
public information point of view?
A. Brief description of the disaster -
B. Two specific reasons why it was the worst -
(1)
(2)
4. In designing a Public Information Disaster Plan, for a command, a particular









5. In designing a Public Information "Disaster Kit", ie. , a prepared packet,
desk drawer, or briefcase containing time-saving materials for use in a








6. In a peacetime naval disaster situation, what three DO's and DON'T's would








7. Each disaster situation is unique, However, there are certain lessons
learned from each which can be applied to those disasters which will
unfortunately occur in the future. From your personal experiences, what
particular areas do you consider worthy of special attention? Critical
times? Helpful Hints. Danger areas?

APPENDIX C
Manual prepared by the Texas Gas Transmission Corporation
entitled, "Meet The Press" and distributed to employees. Also included is the






P.O. BOX 1 160 OWENSBORO, KENTUCKY 42301
The press is a powerful medium. It is also a reliable and
responsible one.
Most of us would rather be without bacon and eggs at break-
fast than to be without our morning newspaper. Hunched over our tables
in quiet concentration, we learn how the Yankees outslugged the Reds in
a World Series championship game. Or, if the breakfast hour finds us
in a more scholarly mood, we can read all the information available to
a private citizen about hydrogen bomb tests and summit conferences.
The point is, we depend on our newspaper. From its pages
we learn what movies to see and which ones to pass up, what to buy and
where to buy it, and quite often, whom we should like and whom we should
dislike
.
That is why our company is vitally interested in its relations
with the press. A news story favorable to Texas Gas can be worth even
more than an advertisement prepared by our own people. An unfavorable
news account, on the other hand, can cost our company dearly through the
loss of good will
.
Over the years, we have built a good reputation with the press.
Much of the credit belongs to you and to the competent manner in which you
are conducting the operations under your control.
But a serious emergency, if not handled correctly, can destroy
a good reputation. Our handling of press relations during these crucial mo-
ments could very well determine what the general public will think of our




At the scene of an emergency, you may be the only qualified
person to talk with representatives of the press. At such a time, the
reputation and good will of our company rests in your hands alone.
"Meet the Press" is designed to assist you by showing how
the presentation of clear, unbiased facts will help prevent "sensational"










A manual to assist employees in their contact with
the press in the event of an accident or emergency,




Major accidents, whether caused by acts of God, sabotage, or
failure of equipment, can happen in our industry as well as in any other.
Suppose you are the ranking supervisor on duty when something
goes wrong.
You'd be busy -- plenty busy! Quick decisions would have to be
made. People gathered at the scene must be kept safely out of the way.
There might be need for first aid treatment.
In the midst of all this, a tall, slender fellow with a camera in
his hand might amble up to you and say:
"I'm a newspaper reporter. Can you give me some idea of what
happened here ? "
What are you going to say to him? Does the company approve
of your giving out details? Have you got time to talk with a newspaperman?
THE REPORTER'S VIEWPOINT
Give the newsman a fair shake, and look at the situation from
his point of view.
A reporter, whether he is from a newspaper, or a broadcasting
or television station, has come to report the facts, not to pass judgment
on our company. His finished news story will be checked and rechecked





reporter must be told exactly what happened and must have background
information to use in his story.
Supervisors at the scene of an emergency should keep in mind
that the newspaper is going to get the story one way or another. If the
reporter can't get information by going through the front door, he'll be
forced through the back door. That is, he will have to rely on the color-
ful, but usually inaccurate, stories of bystanders. Your own report of
the accident, quite naturally, would be more agreeable to the company
than that of an excitable grandmother who saw the whole thing through her
kitchen window.
The reporter, just like all of us, has a job to do. If he is given
the courteous cooperation of company officials, there is no reason why his
finished product should not be a fair and impartial report.
But if the reporter is denied a factual account and background
of the emergency and is forced to rely on the exciting but unknowing accounts
of passers-by, the relationship of our company to the reading public (which
includes nearly everybody) can be seriously damaged.
WHAT THE REPORTER WANTS
Everyone studied the five W's in grade school -- who, what, when,
where, why.
Some day, at the scene of a major accident, you may have a
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reporter's job easier for him by being familiar with the basic questions he
must ask before writing any news story. And by having the answers to the
basic questions ready as soon as humanly possible, you will be building a
bridge of understanding between your company and the press that will be
hard to erase in the future.
Just to refresh your memory, the five W's are:
WHAT: Nature of accident; physical damage to pipeline,
compressor station, and other company property
and equipment; physical damage to the property
of others and owners' names and addresses; how
service will be affected by the emergency; what
repairs will be made and how long they will take
to complete
.
WHO: Nature and extent of injuries; names, ages, ad-
dresses, occupations of any injured; what injured
were doing at accident scene; disposition of in-
jured; if removed to hospital, what hospital and
where; name of doctor who treated injured.
WHEN: Time of accident
WHERE: Type of area where emergency occurred; approxi-
mate distances to nearest landmarks or towns; type
of terrain.
WHY Cause of accident, if known,
-4-
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Chaos will result if every pipeline crew member at the emer-
gency scene tries to give an account of the accident to newsmen.
Ten or 20 voices clamoring for a reporter's attention will only
muddle his understanding, not help it. Our company does not believe in
keeping secrets -- you know that already. But to avoid confusion, there
must be a channel of responsibility in giving out information to the press.
Imagine a large pie! Each employee at the site of the accident,
let us say, has one piece of the pie -- one piece of information about the
accident. Remember that his limited viewpoint makes it nearly impossible
for him to have all the facts. But a reporter "hungry" for the whole pie
cannot be filled on just a few pieces of it. Therefore, we must appoint
someone to combine all the separate pieces of pie, that is, information,
and allow him to present it in its complete form to the press. Only by
proceeding in such an orderly manner can we be sure of giving a factual
and accurate account of the situation to newsmen.
Those authorized to represent the company in dealing with the
press are:
1. The Ranking Supervisor at the Emergency Site. This is
the compressor station manager, pipeline crew foreman or district pipeline
manager in the field, or any other supervisor who is initially in charge at
the emergency scene. Press relations is his job until the arrival of a division
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2. Division Manager or Division Superintendent . He is
authorized to deal with the press as soon as he arrives at the site or
whenever he has confirmed infonnation from the scene of the accident
which will enable him to give an accurate account to newsmen.
3. Department Head or Representative of Management . His
job is to take over press relations when he arrives at the scene and to
clarify the account by telling what effect the emergency will have on the
general system. He may also provide background material for newsmen.
4. Representative of the Public Relations Department. He acts
as a liaison officer between representatives of the company and the press.
If no contact with the press has been made by the time he takes over, all
information to be issued by any other company official should first be
channeled through the public relations representative. Additionally, the
operating head of the department involved in the emergency must keep
the public relations department fully informed at all times about the sit-
uation at the emergency site. This is for the benefit of newspapermen
who will be calling directly to Owensboro for information.
NEVER should an unauthorized employee attempt to deal with
the press. Members of pipeline and compressor station crews, dis-
patchers, and others who are in charge of associated company facilities
involved in handling the emergency should NOT comment on the situation
to the press
.
In the event a dispatching office is contacted by the local news-






1. Refer the reporter to the public relations department at
Owensboro
.
2. Tell the reporter that the information desired will be
obtained from official sources and call the public relations department
for an official statement on the matter. Then call the reporter back.
Under no circumstances should information be released to the press
based on conversation overheard on the company leased line or radio.
BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY
The reporter will not be hesitant to quote directly anything you
say at the site of the emergency.
For this reason, it is important that you be extremely cautious
in your terminology when dealing with the press. Your comments should
give only the facts of the matter and avoid any kind of exaggeration.
An expression like "the damn thing just blew sky high" might
wind up as an exact quote in the story the reporter will write.
COURTESY IS IMPORTANT
The company spokesman will make friends for Texas Gas by
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UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES should an employee say to a
reporter:
"I'm not allowed to talk."
"I can't tell you anything. "
"I don't have time to talk to you."
If the employee cannot break away from what he is doing to
take the reporter to the authorized spokesman at the scene of an emer-
gency, he should send someone with him to be sure that he reaches the
proper person and does not venture into a danger area.
Employees who are stationed around an emergency area to
prevent spectators from entering danger areas should be courteous at
all times. Those employees may be the only direct contact the spec-
tators will ever have with Texas Gas, and that contact should be remem-
bered as a courteous one.
All employees, regardless of position, should treat reporters
with respect, and escort them to the ranking supervisor or public rela-
tions representative immediately upon the newsman's arrival at the scene
Never should a reporter or photographer be permitted to enter
a danger zone where he might cause injuries to himself or others. AL-
WAYS give the newsman a complete and courteous explanation of why he
must be kept out of a particular area. Make it very plain that you are
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If complete information is not available at the time the reporter
is at the scene, and he asks to be phoned when other information is avail-
able, be sure to honor his request as quickly as possible.
DON'T
Some important DON'TS to keep in mind:
DON'T guess at the cause . A crystal ball is not one of the tools
of a Texas Gas employee. Tell the reporter the cause is
undetermined if you are not positively sure of what caused
the situation.
DON'T guess at a man's injuries . Get the accurate information
from the doctor in regard to limbs broken and internal
injuries
.
DON'T say the pipeline "exploded." Be factual! Refer to a
ruptured line as a "line break." Such words as "explosion"
create a fear complex on the part of the public toward the
natural gas industry.
DON'T say the section of pipeline or the compressor station unit
will be out of operation for a certain length of time with-
out pointing out what the company is doing to maintain
service during the time the equipment will be out of order.
Most important to the newspaper's readers is whether or
not they will be without gas service and, if so, for how long,
In most cases, alternate equipment will be substituted for
-13
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that which is damaged and service will not be interrupted.
But, if the company man in charge answers the reporter
that the damaged equipment will be inoperative for weeks
and does not explain that service will not be affected, the
newspaper article may come out with glaring headlines:
BLANKTOWN WILL BE WITHOUT GAS TWO WEEKS.
DON'T attempt to estimate the damage in dollars. You may call
the damage "extensive" or "minor," but only the operating
heads are authorized to comment on the exact valuation of
damage. You may also reveal how many compressor units




When the danger is over at the emergency site, stop by the news-
paper office to see if any more information is needed and thank the reporter
if he has written a good story.
Newsmen, like all other humans, appreciate a friendly pat on the
back every now and then. This kind of thoughtfulness will help build even
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Operating Supervisors, Department Heads,
and Public Relations Department
Texas Gas Switchboard: 683-2431
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W. A. Johnson, Jr.
General Superintendent of Operations
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Don C. Benson, Director of Storage
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James M. Pruden, Supervisor, Field Storage
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